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ABSTRACT 
Life science technologies are some of the most comprehensive and difficult to evaluate as 
investment opportunities. If Venture Capitalists can only invest in a specific number of 
portfolio investments, it is crucial that the investment opportunities chosen are those that are 
also the most likely to succeed. Investor perception risks due to lack of qualification, 
technology comprehension, information asymmetry or overconfidence, are factors that may 
limit Venture Capitalists from choosing investments that create wealth. 
To date, little research has been dedicated into the understanding of risk perception and 
technology comprehension among Venture Capitalists who specialize in life science 
investment opportunities. This study included a literature review as well as nineteen ( 19) 
semi-formal interviews with Venture Capitalists located on the West Coast of Canada and 
United States. Results show that interviewed Venture Capitalists are, overall, qualified in 
making life science investment decisions. However, results also showed that there are trends 
towards Venture Capital adverse selection and overconfidence during investment selection, 
particularly with respect to personal performance. Results further showed that adverse 
selection may occur simply as a way of reducing risk, particularly information asymmetry 
risk. In these instances it appears that opportunity selection is geared towards selection of 
known and trusted management rather than actual investment opportunity. Differences 
between West Coast Canadian and United States Venture Capitalists were also found. These 
differences specifically included the degree to which selection risks are taken, where 
interviewed Canadian Venture Capitalists appeared to be more ethical and cautious investors, 
and interviewed United States Venture Capitalists were concerned with creating wealth out 
of innovative technologies in a wide variety of geographical locations. 
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ABBREVIATION/TERM 
Adequate Methodology 
Adverse Selection: 
Biopharmaceutical: 
Biotechnology: 
Biotechnology Company: 
Biologics: 
Clinical Trials: 
GLOSSARY 
DEFINITION - Based on definitions from: 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/pub/views/home.html 
Sufficient and suitable method to achieve the intended purpose 
Is a type of poor or "bad" selection that occurs due to 
information asymmetries between buyers and sellers; such as 
between investors and entrepreneurs. 
Biopharmaceuticals are medical drugs produced by 
biotechnology. The first such substance approved for 
therapeutic use was recombinant insulin in 1982. 
Biotechnology is technology based on biology mechanisms. It 
can be used in agriculture, energy production, food science, 
environmental purposes and medicine. Biotechnology uses the 
structure and function of biological systems and is often used to 
improve or assist cellular processes such as energy metabolism, 
gene transfer between unrelated species, or the engineering and 
development of synthesis of medical technology, drugs and 
therapies. 
A corporation or venture that is engaged in the research, 
development, production and provision of biotechnology for the 
purpose of developing or providing products or processes for 
specific commercial or public purposes, including, but not 
limited to, medical, pharmaceutical, nutritional, and other 
health-related purposes, agricultural purposes, and 
environmental purposes. 
These are viruses, serums, toxins, and similar products of 
natural or synthetic origin and include antitoxins, vaccines, live 
micro organisms, killed micro organisms, as well as 
components of micro organisms. Products are intended for use 
in the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of diseases of humans 
and animals . 
These are systematic studies in human patients that endeavour 
to determine the safety and efficacy of new or unproven medical 
therapies. There are three phases of systematic clinical testing in 
the United States and Canada. Phase I trials determine the 
criteria for safety parameters of the therapy. These trials usually 
involve small numbers of patients and test the therapy in a range 
of doses to find the safest and most optimal dose. Phase II trials 
establish whether the therapy, at safe and optimal doses, works 
ABBREVIATION/TERM 
Cold Calling Technique: 
Disease Disposition: 
Disease Indication: 
Efficacy: 
Evaluate: 
Exploratory Research: 
Gene therapy: 
High Risk Investment 
DEFINITION- Based on definitions from: 
http://www .oxfordreference.com/pub/views/home.htm I 
for the disease. Otherwise know as efficacy of the therapy. 
These trials should also help define factors such as which 
patients might benefit from the therapy. Finally, Phase III trials 
compare the new therapies to other therapies and/or to placebo. 
These trials are usually very large and they involve enough 
patients to reasonably show the drug's benefits and potential 
adverse reactions. A company must obtain phase III data before 
applying for FDA approval of a new drug. 
A technique via telephone, in person or by e-mail used to make 
contact with unknown person or organization for the purpose of 
setting up an interview, relaying information or gaining 
information. A basic introduction is given by the caller, 
explaining what the call is about in the hope that the 
information sought after is given. 
A position whereby a person has a particular risk of having or 
contriving a particular disorder or pathology that affects health. 
A symptom or condition that indicates that a particular disorder 
or pathology is present of which requires a specific medical 
treatment or procedure; for example in cancer there indications 
ofbreast, prostate, pancreatic, lung etc. 
The desired and measured ability of a drug/therapy to control or 
cure a disorder or pathology. 
To examine both the strengths and advantages, as well as the 
weaknesses and limitations of a question or project and then try 
to reach a judgment. 
A method used by a researcher when little information is known 
about the area to be researched and when research questions are 
unclear. It is a method that is not used to test specific research 
hypotheses. 
The insertion of genes into a person's cells and/or tissues to treat 
a disease or a hereditary disease disposition. Gene therapy 
comprises of the replacement of a defective gene with a 
functional one. Gene therapy is a biotechnology that is still in 
early stages of development. 
Occurs when there is an increased or extreme chance of failure 
ofthe investment involved. 
ABBREVIATION/TERM 
Human Capital: 
Information Asymmetry: 
Innovative: 
Innovation: 
Intellectual Property: 
Investment Capital: 
Investment Opportunity: 
Key Opinion Leader: 
Life Science Sector: 
Likert Scale: 
DEFINITION- Based on definitions from: 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/pub/views/home.html 
Human assets consisting of items such as experienced and 
skilled workers and management. 
Occurs when one party to a transaction has more and/or 
improved information about a project than the other party. 
Typically it is the seller that knows more about the product than 
the buyer. The buyer may be impeded by lack of information 
due to education, comprehension or hidden information. 
Being able to create a new idea, method, product, process or 
device. 
The act of creating a new idea, method, product, process or 
device. Innovation includes both the invention as well as the 
work required to bring an idea to its final form. 
Intellectual property are ideas, inventions, literary and artistic 
works, symbols, names, images, processes, methods and designs 
used in business and all of which have commercial value. 
Intellectual property is usually protected from being used by 
others in the format of patents, trademarks and copyrights. 
Money that is spent I allocated towards a project for the purpose 
of making a project successful in generating more money in the 
future. 
Is a technology or idea that requires investment capital for 
further development. 
Within life science technologies, in particular those 
technologies that involve drug development and medical 
devices, Key Opinion Leaders are physicians and to some extent 
scientists, who influence their peers' medical practices, 
including but not limited to medical and prescribing behaviour. 
This is a business sector that is defined by the National Venture 
Capital Association of United States and includes both the 
biotechnology and medical device industries combined. 
Is a response scale often used in questionnaires, and is the most 
widely used scale in survey research. The questions are set such 
that the respondents specify their level of agreement to a 
statement ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The 
scale is named after Rensis Likert, 1932. 
ABBREVIATION/TERM 
Medical Devices: 
Monitor: 
Overconfidence: 
Perception Risk: 
Qualitative Research: 
Quantitative Research: 
Risk: 
DEFINITION- Based on definitions from: 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/pub/views/home.html 
Instruments, apparatuses, diagnostics, machines, implants, or 
other similar or related article including a component part, or 
accessories which are intended for use in the diagnosis, 
prevention, and treatment of disease, disorders and pathologies. 
To conduct continual examination activities such as checking, 
supervising, and screening of project progress or a situation. 
Is defined as the state when people are or become more 
confident in their behaviour and attitudes than the situation 
warrants. It is also a state that is linked with excessive risk 
taking. 
Is a type of cognitive risk that is linked with people's subjective 
judgement with respect to what is considered risky. It was 
recognized and discussed by Chauncey Starr in 1969. 
This refers to research where only characteristics of something 
are described, rather than exact numerical measurement. 
This refers to research comprised of observations that involve 
measurements and numbers. 
Risk is the potential harm that may arise from some present 
process or from some future event. It can be measured in terms 
of probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses. 
Valuable Biopharmaceutical Are defined as projects that proceed and pass successfully into 
Project: the market place after development has been completed. 
Venture Capital: 
Venture Capitalist (VC): 
Is the capital committed to an unproven venture. The initial, 
start-up money is referred to as "seed money" and entails the 
greatest risk. 
A Venture Capitalist is someone who invests venture capital 
raised from investors into promising but yet unproven business 
ventures. Typically, Venture Capitalists search for a higher rate 
of return than might be given by more traditional investments. 
VCs have three main roles 1) Raising capital from investors; 2) 
Selecting projects and 3) Assisting the management team of a 
project to manage selected projects. VCs also demand very 
high rates of return on investment- typically 35-40%. 
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CHAPTER ONE -Introduction and Statement of Problem 
1.1 Background 
The development of life science technologies, particularly biotechnology and medical 
devices, are probably some of the most intricate, lengthy and complex processes that present 
themselves today within our global economies and financial systems (Baeyens et al., 2006; 
Baum and Silverman 2004; DiMasi et al., 2003; Fetterhoff and Voelkel, 2006; Shepard et al., 
2003). Biotechnology is technology based on biological systems. Defined by the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, an international treaty that was adopted at the 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992: 
"Biotechnology means any technological application that uses biological systems, 
living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific 
use" (Earth Summit) 
Medical devices are also becoming extremely complex as they move from a general medical 
instrument focus into actual becoming part of human drug delivery systems. The United 
States' Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the main regulatory body in North America 
for both biotechnologies and medical devices, define a medical device as: 
"An instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro 
reagent or other similar or related article, including a component part, or accessory which is 
intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or intended to affect the 
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve 
any of its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man 
15 
or other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of 
any of its primary intended purposes. " (FDA). 
Biotechnology and medical devices reach into a large and diverse marketplace touching all 
fields of human knowledge, including pharmaceuticals, food, fuel, as well as our waste 
product processes; in a sense encompassing some of the most pioneering and valuable 
creations that people have had the courage to invent (DiMasi et al., 2003; Rousu et al., 2004). 
Within the life sciences realm of pharmaceutical, medicine and disease, however, it can 
assuredly be stated that biotechnology and medical devices have played some of their most 
important roles. Over the past two decades, biotechnology and medical devices have 
contributed enormously to our understanding of the molecular dimensions of pathology 
making huge contributions towards conquering human disease (Amir-Aslani and Negassi 
2006; Bains 2004; Edwards et al., 2003) In fact, thirty-five percent (35%), or 95 out of256, 
of all new therapeutic products that have been approved in the past ten years have come 
directly from the life science field (Edwards, et al., 2003). Presently thirty percent (30%) of 
all current clinical trials are biotechnology and medical device product based (Edwards, et 
al., 2003). This is an amazing feat for a life science industry, especially biotechnology, that 
did not truly exist before its conception in the late 1970's (Amir-Aslani and Negassi 2006; 
Bains 2004; Edwards et al. , 2003). 
It is therefore not surprising that within the life science sector industry, Venture Capitalists 
are courted and enamoured by biotechnology and medical device inventors with prospects of 
not only being part of "sexy" and innovative technology development for the greater benefit 
to society, but also by the possible wealth generated by potentially sky-scraping returns on 
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investment as these innovations are developed and enter the market place (Baeyens et al., 
2006; Baum and Silverman 2004; DiMasi et al., 2003; Fetterhoff and Voelkel, 2006; Shepard 
et al., 2003). 
Venture Capital is capital, usually in the form of cash, used to invest an equity-based interest 
in a new or existing company, where a Venture Capitalist is a person who makes and decides 
on such investments. Investment return usually comes from preferred stock, a share of 
profits, royalties or capital appreciation of common stock. Most Venture Capitalists look for 
companies with high growth potential (Berlin, 1998; Dimov and Shepherd, 2004). 
Traditionally, the Venture Capital Industry has been an important source of early stage 
investment capital to new life science ventures, enabling some of the most dynamic and 
exciting novel products to be developed in such unmet medical needs areas as cancer, 
diabetes, invasive surgery and infectious diseases including AIDS (Baeyens et al., 2006; 
Baum and Silverman 2004; Champenois et al., 2006; Coombs et al., 2006). Whereas large 
public pharmaceutical corporations are mostly consumed with purchasing and bringing later 
stage biotechnology and devices into the market, Venture Capital has provided the seed 
funding for exceptional life science research to be developed (Angell, 2004) All in all, 
Venture Capital has been an important source of early stage investment capital, especially in 
the United States where approximately thirty-five percent (35%) of all Venture Capital 
investments, whether in life science, high tech, etc., are dispersed to seed and start up 
fledging firms (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Manigart et al., 2000; National Venture Capital 
Association). 
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As selectors and investors of new ventures, Venture Capitalists are often portrayed, within 
the business world, as having superhuman characteristics for picking the right projects 
(Baeyens et al., 2006; Baum and Silverman 2004; Bishop and Nixon, 2005). They are 
considered to be highly qualified selectors and investors of high risk projects, are described 
as reducers of information asymmetries, said to be "coaches" and "monitors" after 
investments have been made, and are depicted as having an instinctive capability to act 
within complex and uncertain environments (Amit et al., 1998; Baeyens et al. , 2006; Baum 
and Silverman 2004; Bishop and Nixon, 2005; Shepard et al., 2003; Shepard and Zacharakis, 
2001). 
Many life science investment opportunities that have been given large amounts of Venture 
Capital investment capital, however, fail, especially within the life science arena (Baeyens et 
al., 2006; Baum and Silverman 2004; http://www.biostrategy.gc.ca). Venture Capital 
investment opportunities, generally, have a low success rate where only one in two hundred 
projects becoming highly profitable, with the majority of projects only just making a return 
on investment, and where approximately fifteen to twenty percent (15-20%) fail outright 
(Amit et al., 1998; Berlin 1998; Sah1man, 1990; Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). Life science 
technologies, however, especially technologies that specialize in the therapeutic drug 
development arena, are considered even higher venture risks (Baeyens et al. , 2006; Danzon 
et al., 2005; DiMasi et al. , 2003). The initial failure rate during the discovery and 
developmental stages can be enormous, with postulations that only one in 10,000 new life 
science entities succeed to the market as new therapeutics (DiMasi et al., 2003; Evans and 
Varaiya, 2003; Fetterhoff and Voelkel, 2006; Pharma Ventures 2005). 
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Regulatory and ethical uncertainty risks are some of the important reasons why this lack of 
success occurs. Regulatory boards of health, such as the FDA of the United States and the 
Therapeutics Products Directorate of Canada (TPD) are understandably mandated to protect 
the public from ineffective, unethical and unsafe life science technologies. But sometimes 
public opinion can also create an aura in which a project is perceived to be too unethical for 
its intended purposes such as in the case of stem cell research, nano-medical devices and 
genetically modified foods (DiMasi et al., 2003; Rousu et al. , 2004). 
Much life science technology has extremely long development timelines, especially within 
the biotechnology realm, where an average of ten to fifteen years of development before 
market sales, is not unusual (Baeyens et al., 2006; Baum and Silverman 2004; DiMasi et al., 
2003; Fetterhoff and Voelkel, 2006). Long development timelines equates to long timelines 
before financial reward can be generated. Long time lines also present the risk of new life 
science ventures developing "better" technology and intellectual property before the initial 
technology investment can become financially productive (Baeyens et al. , 2006; Baum and 
Silverman 2004; DiMasi et al., 2003; Fetterhoff and Voelkel, 2006). This poses both high 
risk as well as obstacles for life science investors, in particular Venture Capitalists, who want 
to see a return on their investments within an average of three to five years, depending on 
their fund portfolios (Berlin, 1998). 
Life science projects have extreme appetites for investment capital (DiMasi et al., 2003; 
Rawlins, 2005). Coombs et al. (2006) noted that the development of technology, and in 
particularly biotechnology 
" ... may be characterized as research engines fuelled with burning cash. " 
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It has been suggested that to bring a new innovative life science product forward from 
conception to market, particularly within the biotechnology arena, can be in excess of 800 
million USD (DiMasi et al., 2003). This is especially the case ofbiopharmaceutical ventures, 
which require human capital investments of highly trained personnel, including the Venture 
Capitalists themselves who assist with the operation of the ventures, specialized 
infrastructure and partnerships as well as large amounts of cash for the development of the 
technology. 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
With the amount capital needed along with the development risks involved it is perhaps 
somewhat surprising that these life science technologies get funding at all by Venture 
Capitalists. Because of the investment risks involved, it is also surprising that relatively little 
research has been dedicated into the understanding of risk perception and technology 
comprehension among Venture Capitalists who specialize in such high risk ventures 
(Coombs et al., 2006; Franke et al., 2006; Shepherd et al., 2003). Whereas the area of risk 
perception, venture comprehension and risk aversion strategies have been greatly studied in 
entrepreneurial research (Baron, 2006; Dittrich, 2005; Forlani et al. , 2000; Gregoire et al. , 
2006) it is only recently that research has been dedicated to the understanding of these risks 
within the Venture Capital industry (Franke et al., 2006; Mullins and Forlani, 2005; 
Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001 ). Risks associated with lack of life science comprehension 
and perception biases may be large contributors to whether a life science venture reaches a 
successful exit or even gets funded. Understanding the risk perceptions combined with the 
comprehension and aversion strategies used by Venture Capitalists that specialize in life 
science investments, is therefore important. 
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A large amount of life science technology is both scientifically novel as well as complex 
(Baeyens et al. , 2006; Baum and Silverman 2004; DiMasi et al., 2003; Fetterhoff and 
Voelkel, 2006). Life science technologies, especially biopharmaceutical technologies, which 
cover complex biological systems and which may be presented with limited Proof of 
Principle data, are both difficult to understand and assess (Baeyens et al. , 2006; Evans and 
Nikhil, 2003 ; Lockett et al., 2002). Experience level, venture comprehension along with 
adverse selection by Venture Capitalists, may be some of the most important factors involved 
with respect to why a life science investment is either made or denied as well as why some 
chosen investments fail. In addition, both venture comprehension and adverse selection may 
lead to higher technology development risks, longer timelines and higher requirements for 
capital, simply because poor initial decisions were made. It may also lead to increased risks 
from both the regulatory and ethical perspectives, because project comprehension may 
sponsor shortcuts that are poor choices. Subsequently, within the high risk environment of 
life science technology development, are Venture Capitalists, who specialize in investing in 
these technologies, aware of their own perception risks when they decide which investment 
opportunities will create value in the future, and which will not? 
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CHAPTER TWO - Scope and Study Objectives 
2.1 Scope 
The scope of this research will focus , logistically, on the West Coast of Canada and the 
United States and the life science Venture Capitalists that operate within this geographic 
area. On the West Coast of Canada and the United States, there are three cluster areas 
specializing in life science: Vancouver area, British Columbia; Seattle area, Washington 
State and California including San Francisco and San Diego (Global Direct Investment 
Solutions). Aside from being located on the West Coast ofNorth America, these areas have 
traits in common: university core research centres, where innovative science and technology 
can be discovered; hospitals and other publicly/private funded research development centres; 
and importantly, a highly skilled labour pool where both scientific, technically and business 
trained people can be drawn from (Global Direct Investment Solutions). For logistic and 
project time constraint reasons, the research will focus on interviewing Venture Capitalists 
from the Vancouver area on the Canadian West Coast and the United States West Coast, 
focusing on Seattle but extending to California. A sample size often (10) from each of these 
two countries was endeavoured. It is important to note that some of the Vancouver Venture 
Capitalists operate all across Canada and the Seattle and California Venture Capitalists 
operate all across the United States. 
The research will be centered on the perception risk, education and experience levels of, as 
well as selection strategies and evaluation processes used by Venture Capitalists who 
specialized in life science investments; the focal point being on new life science ventures and 
whether there are differences between the two main cluster regions chosen. 
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The research will further focus on Venture Capitalists who specialize in human 
pharmaceutical/medical life science opportunities only. The pharmaceutical/medical life 
science venture opportunity scope will include such technologies as drug molecules, 
biologics, medical devices and gene therapy, all of which will have the intent of having 
efficacy within the human internal systems to fight or correct disease dispositions. 
2.2 Study Purpose and Objectives 
The purpose of this study is to research, how Venture Capitalists evaluate and select life 
science investments for their fund portfolios and when doing so, whether Venture Capitalists 
are susceptible to potential perception risks. There are several primary objectives that are 
endeavoured to be investigated within this study: 
1) To identify what the current and main investment strategies and criteria are of 
Venture Capitalists who invest in life sciences in Western North America. 
2) To identify whether the current valuation methods/tools that Venture Capitalists 
use are functional in recognizing valuable life science investments. 
3) To identify some of the Venture Capitalists perception risks when choosing 
potential life science investments including information asymmetries, overconfidence, 
as well as education and experience; and to see whether these risks differ between 
two life science cluster areas: West Coast Canada concentrating on Vancouver area 
and West Coast United States Concentrating on Seattle but extending down to 
California. 
4) To identify, in lieu of possible perception risks, whether Venture Capitalists are 
qualified to decide on life science investment opportunities. 
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2.3 Research Questions 
Four ( 4) main research questions have been identified, each testing whether there is a 
difference between the two identified areas of West Coast Canada: Vancouver area, and West 
Coast United States: Seattle area extending to the California. 
1. Are there specific life science investment strategies and criteria that Venture 
Capitalists seek? 
2. Do these Venture Capitalists use specific valuation methods to identify investment 
opportunities that they fund? If yes, what processes and methods do they use to select 
investment opportunities? 
3. Are Venture Capitalists susceptible to perception risks such as information 
asymmetries when choosing life science investment opportunities? 
4. Are Venture Capitalists qualified to make investment decisions on new life science 
investment opportunities? 
4.1. What are the educational and direct industry experience levels ofVenture 
Capitalists? 
4.2. Does amount of education and/or experience have an effect on which life science 
investment opportunities are chosen? 
4.3. Does a life science investment choice influence future life science investment 
choice? 
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CHAPTER THREE - Study Design and Methodology 
3.1 Overall Study Design 
This study uses primary and secondary research data sources to gather the required 
information to respond to the research questions posed. The research design is comprised of 
two parts: 1) Secondary exploratory research is comprised of a literature review: formal peer 
reviewed journal articles and information gathered via internet resources; and 2) Primary 
descriptive and exploratory research via semi-structured interviews that were conducted 
using a pre-formed questionnaire. 
3.1.1 Literature Review Method 
The formal literature review provides a research foundation to this project and is comprised 
of expert and peer reviewed articles in the fields of business ventures, history and present day 
research on venture capital, venture capital models and international aspects, 
entrepreneurship, evaluation methods, business psychology, and life science. It also aspires 
to incorporate the important aspects of venture capital investment decision making and 
perception risk within the life science field both in Canada, United States and internationally. 
3.1.2 Questionnaire Model and Semi-Structured Interview Method 
The semi-structured interview technique was chosen because former literature has shown that 
Venture Capitalists are not likely to return mail questionnaires interviews before direct and 
personal contact have been made. (Baeyens et al, 2006). Face to face and telephone 
interviews have shown to be effective because they establish a relationship with the Venture 
Capitalists (Baeyens et al, 2006). Furthermore, in the semi-structured interview technique, 
the researcher is able to exercise his or her inventiveness with respect to following up a 
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respondent's answer to a question as well as the ability to clarify questions that the 
respondent may have understood (Hair et al., 2003); yet the interview process is structured to 
ensure that cohesiveness and comparability can be made between respondents. This 
approach has been noted to give unexpected and insightful information that can enhance the 
findings of the research (Hair et al., 2003). 
The questionnaire was designed and structured in a three part sequence: 1) Opening questions 
asking specific background information with respect to the person being interviewed; 2) A 
middle section that directs questions specifically towards the research objectives, such as 
Venture Capital preferred investment criteria; and 3) A final section which asks general 
information questions such as "What are the preferred Venture Capital exit routes?", "What 
are the general costs of life science projects" and " Is there anything extra that you would like 
to add?" Please refer to Appendix A to view the established questionnaire, used with all 
interviews. 
The questionnaire questions were a mix of Likert Scale and open ended opinion questions. 
Likert Scales, invented by Rensis Likert in 1932, are a type of response scale which is ideal 
for the use in gathering survey research information that can be pooled, compared and 
assessed statistically. Maurer and Pierce (1998) performed a comparative study of relevance 
with respect to the Likert type scales and traditional empirical measurement techniques. The 
authors found that Likert Scales were as efficacious, giving similar levels of reliability/error 
variance as well as levels of prediction and in some ways much more user friendly. 
When responding to a Likert questionnaire item, individuals responding to the questionnaire, 
the respondents, specify their level of agreement to a statement ranging from strongly agree, 
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agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree to strongly disagree. Likert Scales are a type of 
psychometric response scale, used in studies concerned with psychological measurements, 
knowledge, abilities and attitudes as well as personality traits. 
The respondents were selected from publicly available Venture Capital listings, internet data 
bases and websites as well as from other life science contact resources (Bridgeway Career 
Development; Resources for Entrepreneurs; B.C. Science and Technology Resources). 
Initial contact with prospective respondents was made via e-mail notice of the study and/or 
cold calling telephoning technique. A focus was made to interview senior and middle 
Venture Capital managers, and these individuals were selected from internet sites etc. , when 
and where possible. If an interest in the study was expressed and participation was consented 
to, a time was established to conduct the interview whether face to face or over the telephone. 
Interviews were set to be completed within a period of fifteen to twenty minutes. 
Confidentiality of all participants and respondents was and will be maintained at all times 
and there will be no identifiers in this report of who and how a person or company 
responded. 
3.1.3 Internet Resources and Venture Capital Sites 
In addition to the literature search and the semi-structured interviews, information and data 
were collected via internet resources and venture capital sites. Information such as general 
venture capital investment strategies, lists of venture capital companies located in specific 
areas on the West Coast of Canada and the United States, as well as specific information 
from participating venture capital companies, were collected (Bridgeway Career 
Development; Resources for Entrepreneurs; B.C Science and Technology Resources). 
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CHAPTER FOUR- Literature Review 
4.1 Structure of Literature Review 
Within the following literature review, I will firstly discuss the history ofVenture Capital, 
the basic model that has been used within the United States for the past few decades, the 
roles that Venture Capitalists play with respect to their investments and in particular the main 
strategies and selection criteria that have been used, especially in regards to life science 
investment opportunities. 
I will discuss and identify the current valuation methods/tools used for identifying valuable 
life science investments and assess as to whether they are functional as recognition 
methods/tools. I will also discuss some ofthe perception risks associated with Venture 
Capitalists that have been discussed in peer reviewed articles over the past decade, including 
information asymmetries and Venture Capitalist's overconfidence. Furthermore I will 
explore whether Venture Capitalists' risk perceptions and investment behaviours, experience 
and education levels differ between countries and why. To do this I will relate, as the Venture 
Capital model has been adopted and adapted by other countries, to how the Venture Capital 
model is changing and whether Canada is following the original United States Venture 
Capital model or whether it is beginning to draft a model of its own. 
In all, this literature review will be related back to the life science industry, the life science 
investment opportunities where possible to discuss and highlight my research questions. 
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4.2 History of Venture Capital 
The goal ofthe Venture Capital Industry has been one to encourage entrepreneurship, 
lessening the existing gaps between the established capital markets and the potential funding 
constraints experienced by new and innovative businesses (Berlin, 1998; Fried and Hisrich, 
1994; Sahlman, 1990). Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) describe Venture Capitalists as: 
" ... organizations whose predominant mission is to finance the founding or early 
growth of new companies that do not yet have access to the public securities market or to 
institutional lenders". 
The Venture Capital Industry conception was originally devised in the United States by 
General Georges Doriot who is considered the industry's father (Campbell, 2003; Sahlman, 
1990). In 1946, Doriot founded American Research and Development Corporation (AR&D) 
with the aim to invest in and encourage the development of new and innovative ideas into 
becoming successful new businesses (Campbell, 2003). With the passage of the Small 
Business Investment Act of 1958, the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) was given 
the ability to license private "Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) which would 
provide financing and management assistance to small entrepreneurial businesses within the 
United States (Campbell, 2003). This matched the ideas and plans of Doriot, who in tum 
invested $70, 000 USD in Digital Equipment Corporation in 1959 (Campbell 2003). 
In 1968, when Digital Equipment went public, it provided AR&D with 101% annualized 
Return on Investment (ROI) and Digital Equipment was considered to have a market value of 
$37 million USD. 
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Digital Equipment was a huge success story. It was an experience that helped to prove that 
the concept of Venture Capital not only could work but that it could also be extremely 
lucrative (Campbell2003). Furthermore, this beginning established the notion ofVenture 
Capital as being at the forefront of entrepreneurship, the funding vehicle of innovation. 
4.2.1 Basic Venture Capital Model 
Within the United States, the Venture Capitalist is typically a member of a small partnership 
network that employs six-to twelve individuals, managing assets averaging between $50-100 
million USD, that have in tum been raised from wealthy individuals, corporations, banking 
institutions, pension funds and government funds (Berlin 1998; Manigart, 2000). Many 
Venture Capital firms today are now managing assets in the hundreds of millions of dollars, 
with an overall United States Venture Capital investment into life sciences sector, of 4.8 
billion USD, comprising only the first two quarters of2007 (National Venture Capital 
Association). 
Generally, Venture Capital firms plan to start at least one new investment fund every five (5) 
years with an expected fund lifespan often (10) years in total. Within each fund that a 
Venture Capitalist establishes, and depending on the original investors involved, a portfolio 
of firms is added, each firm receiving varying amounts of Venture Capital investment 
depending on development stage ofthe venture opportunity (National Venture Capital 
Association). A fund portfolio can hold many firms, usually five (5) to ten (10) (Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994 ), but in some cases, as noted by Berlin ( 1998), funds can hold as many as 
twenty-five (25) firms . The portfolio is usually diverse in terms of the type of firms that are 
invested in, but some funds are specialized, focusing on a specific industry area such as life 
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science, venture risk category or stage of venture funding required (Berlin 1998, Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman, 1990). Furthermore, because portfolio firms are added over time as 
new investment opportunities arise, the portfolio fund usually has a goal of having the 
optimal venture investments funded for only a period of two to three (2-3) years and no 
longer than five to seven (5 to 7) years (Berlin 1998, Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman, 
1990). 
After the first five (5) years of a fund portfolio's life, no new firms are generally added and 
instead, hopefully, the fund enters into a "reaping of reward" stage where initial hurdle rates 
of returns of up to 30-70% are hoped for. This occurs as the different investment 
opportunities are developed within the portfolio fund. At the end of the fund's lifespan often 
(10) years, all the firms within a Venture Capitalist's portfolio are exited via such methods as 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) and buy-backs by other 
firms (Amit et al., 1998; Berlin, 1998; Fried and Hisrich, 1994). When the firms are exited 
and the funds are closed, the Venture Capital firm returns the exited funds, with a pre-
established return on investment, to the original investors, or re-invests, if mandated to by the 
original investors, into new fund opportunities (Amit et al., 1998; Berlin, 1998; Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994). 
Initially when investing in an investment opportunity, Venture Capitalist firms will stipulate 
various developmental goals or milestones that the opportunity requires to reach within a 
specific timeline (Berlin 1998, Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman, 1990). Each major 
development goal or milestone is usually tied to a stage or "round" of financing that the 
Venture Capital firm sets at the beginning of the investment deal agreement allowing the 
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Venture Capital firm to deal out its capital in the most cautious way possible. Each round of 
financing will usually comprise of varying amounts of capital with varying time lines 
attached: from a few million USD in "seed stage" financing with a time line of six ( 6) months 
to complete stage, to tens of millions USD required, on average, to complete later stages of 
development with varying timelines of one (1) to five (5) years long (Berlin 1998, Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman, 1990; National Venture Capital Association). Usually, with a 
promising life science investment opportunity, there is the initial seed stage financing and 
then three (3) subsequent financing rounds before a final exit from the investment is made 
(National Venture Capital Association, 2007). With each stage of financing, the Venture 
Capital firm is ensuring that it has as much control as possible in its investment capital, 
giving itself a "Go/No Go" option out of the investment with each financing round. 
4.2.2 The Roles of Venture Capitalists: Fundraiser 
Over the course of a Venture Capitalist's fund's history, the Venture Capitalist, by and large, 
performs three major professional roles: 1) fundraiser, 2) selector and investor of venture 
opportunities, and 3) as monitor of the ventures that have been invested in. 
Logically, Venture Capitalists can only invest in firms and innovation ifthey themselves 
have funding capital from somewhere. Venture Capitalists receive much of their funding, 
approximately two thirds, from institutional investors such as pension funds, investment 
banking, government grants, and insurance companies (Berlin 1998; Elango et al. , 1995; 
Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Manigart et al., 2002). All these institutional investors, in tum, 
expect reasonable returns from their investments over the portfolio fund's lifespan (Berlin 
1998; Elango et al., 1995; Fried and Hisrich, 1994), and in a sense, Venture Capitalists are 
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the middlemen between the fund investors and the investment opportunities they invest 
within. After the firms of the portfolio fund are exited by the Venture Capitalist, funding is 
returned to these original investors, along with a return on investment averaging around 8% 
(Berlin 1998; Manigart et al., 2002). 
Another important source of investment funding to Venture Capital firms consists of wealthy 
families and groups of individuals who are known as "Angels" (Berlin 1998; Elango et al., 
1995; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman 1990). By pooling the funds from these varying 
"Angel" sources, Venture Capitalists can invest large sums towards new and promising 
venture opportunities within their portfolios (Berlin 1998; Elango et al., 1995; Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman 1990). "Angels" acting on their own may not be able to do this alone 
and the Venture Capitalist again becomes the middleman of investment and the Angel, the 
primary investor, expects reasonable returns over the portfolio fund's lifespan (Berlin, 1998; 
Elango et al., 1995; Manigart et al. , 2002). 
4.2.3 The Roles of Venture Capitalists: Selectors and Investors 
Venture Capitalists are best known as selectors and investors ofbusiness opportunities 
(Berlin 1998; Manigart et al. , 2002; Sahlman, 1990). 1n order for the Venture Capital firm to 
stay viable, it is vital for a Venture Capital firm to select venture opportunities that will return 
its investment profitably, and reject proposals that will not. From the point of view of a 
Venture Capital firm, the faster that proposal selection can be achieved and the less time and 
capital that is spent on the due diligence of an investment opportunity, the better. Therefore, 
the success of a Venture Capital firm is largely based on its ability to predict new portfolio 
33 
investment performance and the selection of investment opportunities that will give a good 
return on investment (Franke et al., 2006; Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). 
When choosing ventures to invest in, Venture Capitalists use specific selection processes, 
and search for criteria that they wish to invest in (Berlin 1998; Elango et al. , 1995; Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman 1990). The rejection rate, of potential portfolio investment 
opportunities, is very high. Berlin (1998) states that for every 100 investment opportunities 
received by a Venture Capitalist, 90 are rejected immediately. Of the remaining ten (10) 
opportunities, only one to two (1-2) proposals are selected (Berlin 1998; Elango et al., 1995; 
Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman 1990). It is these selection processes that are the key to 
which ventures are invested in and which are not. 
4.2.4 The Roles of Venture Capitalists: Monitors 
When investment into an opportunity is finally made, Venture Capitalists begin operating as 
monitors, spending as many as 100 hours per portfolio firm over a six month period (Baeyens 
et al., 2006; Baum and Silverman 2004; Berlin 1998; Champenois et al. , 2006; Elango et al., 
1995; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman 1990). Venture Capitalists' monitoring role is in part 
similar to that of a bank manager who monitors bank loans. But to the Venture Capitalist, the 
monitoring role is the most important role of all , especially with respect to Venture 
Capitalists who invest in early stage firms and who may have to deal with inexperienced 
entrepreneurs and management. The Venture Capitalist's monitoring role is one of trainer, 
guide, and linker, and relationship builder, providing advice, information and networks for 
getting in touch with key human capital. In all it is a role comprised of moving the 
investment opportunity forwards (Baum and Silverman, 2004). To perform this role, the 
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Venture Capitalist will sit on a portfolio firm's Board of Directors, guiding business strategy 
and policies to ensure, as much as possible, that the firm is successful (Baum and Silverman, 
2004; Berlin 1998; Elango et al., 1995; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman 1990). In other 
words, Venture Capital monitoring periods are for nurturing the intangible assets that have 
been invested in. 
4.3 Decision Making Process for Investment Selection 
Much research has been performed in trying to discover what strategies Venture Capitalists 
use to choose investment opportunities, what evaluation methods are used and what 
characteristics/criteria are searched for (Baeyens et al., 2005; Baum and Silverman, 2004; 
Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Le Bas and Picard, 2006; Manigart et al., 2000; MacMillan et al., 
1985, 1987; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002; Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). 
Fried and Hisrich (1994) mention that: 
"The decision to invest is a difficult one with serious adverse selection risk. Once an 
investment is made, the investment is illiquid, and its success is highly dependent on a small 
group of managers/entrepreneurs. " 
When assessing a new business investment opportunity, Venture Capitalists are left with a 
daunting task, especially with respect to assessing novel life science investment opportunities 
that have little to no baseline information available. Therefore it is not surprising that there 
has been so much discussion in the literature with respect to what decision making strategies 
are actually followed and used (Bishop and Nixon, 2006; Champenois et al., 2006; Coombs 
et al, 2006; Mullins and Forlani, 2005). 
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For the sake of this research project and report, I will use the Fried and Hisrich' s (1994) 
model ofVenture Capital investment decision making process as a basis. This model, 
whereas it is a perhaps a little elderly, was based specifically on interviewed Venture 
Capitalists who operated in the western parts of the United States and included life science 
within their portfolios. Elsewhere in the literature, there is little information as to which 
specific decision making strategies are used with respect to life science technological 
investments, with the exception ofBaeyens et al. , (2005) and Baum and Silverman (2004). 
Baeyens et al., (2005) followed a very similar strategic selection process with respect to the 
life science industry, validating to some extent the original Fried and Hisrich (1994) model 
and process. Baeyens et al., (2005) further highlighted specific selection strategies including 
what life science technologies were targeted, preferred stages of development chosen, 
geographical location and minimum and maximum investment required to exit. With respect 
to Baum and Silverman (2004), a very similar model to Fried and Hisrich (1994) was again 
used to research whether Venture Capitalists selected investment opportunities in life science 
that incorporated management, intellectual property or both. In lieu of the similarities, the 
initial Fried and Hisrich (1994) investment selection model will be discussed and used for 
this project. 
From their research, Fried and Hisrich (1994) established, a basic decision making process 
model that they felt captured the main criteria and strategies followed by Venture Capitalists 
in the United States when a new investment opportunity was assessed. This process 
included: Origination, the person who introduced the investment opportunity to the Venture 
Capitalists and who would be involved in the development of the opportunity; Venture 
Capital Firm specific screen, which included criteria such as investment size, location, stage 
36 
of finance; Generic Screen, which included a basic focus on the business plan and investment 
scrutiny; First Phase Evaluation, that determined the seriousness of interest in the investment 
opportunity and scrutiny of management and market comparisons; Second Phase Evaluation, 
that identified the obstacles that may be involved with the investment opportunity and its 
strategy; and Closing of Investment Deal, the incorporated the final decision on whether to 
invest in the business opportunity, the stages of financing required and the timeline attached 
to each of these financing rounds. 
Revisiting the first research question: 
1) Are there specific life science investment strategies and criteria that Venture 
Capitalists seek? 
Fried and Hisrich (1994) discovered that of the general Venture Capital firm within the 
United States that they studied, there indeed has been a common selection criteria used to 
evaluate potential portfolio investment opportunities. They found that there were three (3) 
major subject areas that Venture Capitalists used in selection of portfolio firms to invest in: 
Business Concept, Return on Investment and Management Team. These strategies will be 
discussed further below. 
4.3.1 Business Concept, Location and Intellectual Property 
Within the Business Concept area, the important criteria sought after include the potential for 
earnings growth of the technology invested in, the location of the investment opportunity, 
and its intellectual property standing. The business idea must be able to prove that it works, 
can be completed to a certain level within two to three (2-3) years, and the concept must offer 
competitive advantages, in particular with respect to intellectual property (Fried and Hisrich, 
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1994). Immediately there is a discrepancy that can be identified with respect to successful 
life science investment opportunities that have a developmental life span, on average, of 
fifteen (15) years. 
If Venture Capital firms are selecting investment opportunities that will not see a return on 
investment for fifteen years, yet their finance model in based on returns within two to three 
(2-3) years, there is divergence that needs to be dealt with. Venture Capital firms that invest 
in life science generally circumvent these challenges by focusing on rounds of financing and 
exit strategies for the life science at specific stages of the development process (Baeyens et 
al. , 2005; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Le Bas, 2006). As soon as the life science technology 
is developed to a certain phase and has born good results to that phase, strategies such as 
IPOs or M&As with other companies are used as an outlet to depart from the investment 
(Baeyens et al., 2005; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Le Bas, 2006). These strategies will be 
further explored in the semi-structured interviews. 
The location of the investment opportunity is an important focus ofVenture Capital firms. 
As aforementioned, one of the roles of the Venture Capitalist is as monitor of the future 
investment. This requires that the Venture Capitalist firm has the logistical ability to monitor 
the investment opportunity. If there is a choice between two similar investment opportunities, 
it has been shown that the firm that is located within a reasonable distance to the Venture 
Capitalists head office will most probably be considered as the logistically feasible one to 
invest in, rather than the one which is located outside of the Venture Capitalists geographic 
area (Baeyens et al., 2006; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Berlin 1998). Venture Capital 
monitoring has been discovered to be both important and crucial for success (Baum and 
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Silverman, 2004; Berlin 1998). This is particular the situation within the life science 
industry, where the development timelines and paths are intricate and where management 
requires to be fully aware of the pitfalls and hurdles that can occur (Amir-Aslani and 
Negassi, 2006; Baum and Silverman, 2004). Therefore the selection of investment 
opportunities that logistically favours monitoring, is not just a Venture Capitalist strong 
selection criterion, but it is also critical for when the Venture Capital firm begins working 
with the management team and monitoring of the portfolio firm 's strategic goals. 
Another Business Concept focus of Venture Capital firms, in particular for those who deal 
with life science investment opportunities, is the intellectual property involved (Baeyens et 
al., 2006). Intellectual property rights are an important focus because to some extent these 
rights provide justification of the exclusivity of the technology involved. A typical piece of 
technology can be protected under patent for up to twenty (20) years (Canadian Intellectual 
Property Office; United States and Trade Office for Intellectual Property). The longer a 
technology is protected under patent, the more unique the technology is considered, the 
broader the concept platform is, and the more individuals interested in the intellectual 
property, then the more likely a Venture Capital firm will invest in the technology 
opportunity (Baeyens et al. , 2006; Baum and Silverman, 2004; DiMasi et al. , 2003). In 
essence, the intellectual property is what the Venture Capitalist is investing in and the more 
promising it is, the more likely the Venture Capitalist will see a return on investment 
(Baeyens et al., 2006). It is the intangible asset that will be developed and later sold, if it 
succeeds. In circumstances where the investment opportunity's intellectual property cannot 
be protected or it is owned by several contesters at once, it has been shown that the Venture 
Capitalists interest readily decline and they will not usually invest (Baum and Silverman, 
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2004; DiMasi et al. , 2003; Evans and Varaiya, 2003; Fetterhoff and Voelkel, 2006; Pharma 
Ventures 2005). Baum and Silverman (2004) further found that Venture Capitalists are more 
likely to invest in venture opportunities that have more than one successful patent. The 
importance of intellectual property will be further explored in the semi-structured interviews 
and results of this study. 
4.3.2 Return on Investment and Financial Valuation 
The potential Return on Investment is important for the Venture Capitalist to stay viable and 
this leads to focus of the second research question: 
2) Do Venture Capitalists use specific valuation methods to identify investment opportunities 
that they fund? If yes, what processes and methods do they use to select investment 
opportunities? 
In order to survive as a Venture Capital firm, the investments that are made must make 
returns that allow for future capital to be raised and invested (Fried and Hisrich, 1994). 
Therefore a Venture Capital business opportunity must be able to provide an exit opportunity 
that offers a potential high rate of return ranging from 30-70%, before investment can be 
considered (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman, 1990). However, for Venture Capitalists that 
specialize investing in innovative early stage firms, and especially in high risk industries such 
as the life sciences, it is not easy to ascertain what a reasonable rate of return on investment 
capitulates due to the lack of industry baselines on novel ventures (Baum and Silverman, 
2004; DiMasi et al., 2003; Evans and Varaiya, 2003; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman 
1990). Furthermore, it has been shown that many financial valuation techniques and models 
that could potentially be used when assessing return on investment, such as project 
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simulation models, Discount Cash Flow models, and enterprise valuation models, become 
unpredictable very quickly when used for novel early stage investment opportunities that 
have long timelines, unforeseen risks involved and no revenue stream flowing in for many 
years to come (Berlin 1998; Elango et al., 1995; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman 1990). 
Venture Capital firms, therefore, have been shown to demand extremely high rates of 
potential returns of 100-300% for these types of investments, setting strict guidelines in 
place, using experience, comparables, rules of thumb, and marketing assessments that gives 
them a sense of what similar investments are worth at a specific stage of development (Berlin 
1998; Elango et al. , 1995; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Patzelt et al. , 2006; Sahlman 1990). 
This is why Business Concept and Return on Investment, go hand in hand, in particular with 
respect to life science opportunities. The Business Concept undertaken will need to be 
assessed comparably to understand whether it is a viable opportunity to invest in, what the 
market niche is, the intellectual property, what the competition is and whether investment 
into such a business/technology opportunity will give acceptable returns on investment from 
past experiences and examples (Baum and Silverman, 2004; DiMasi et al., 2003; Evans and 
Varaiya, 2003; Fetterhoff and Voelkel, 2006; Patzelt et al. , 2006; Pharma Ventures 2005). 
Business Concept and initial marketing assessments are therefore key determinants to 
understanding the return on investment of a life science investment opportunity and not so 
much the financial criteria and valuation techniques that are used with other types of 
investments such as computer software and hardware. This will be further explored in the 
semi-structured interview results and discussion of this study. 
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4.3.3 Management Team 
The Management Team of an investment opportunity is probably the most important 
criterion that Venture Capitalists select for; especially in the United States (Baum and 
Silverman, 2004; Dimov and Shepherd, 2004; Franke et al. , 2006; Manigart et al. , 2002). 
It is necessary for Venture Capitalists to be able to work with and trust the management team 
of their portfolio firms and to assure that relayed information during the development of the 
investment is correct (Dimov and Shepherd, 2004). Management criteria consequently 
include characteristics such as managers' personal integrity, good track records, realism, 
flexibility and the exhibition of good leadership (Fried and Hisrich, 1994). These criteria are 
highly subjective depending on how they are evaluated and they are difficult to assess, 
especially with regards to new entrepreneurial management that have no previous experience. 
Further to their earlier work, Fried and Hisrich (1998) also discovered that the originator of 
an investment opportunity is the most important aspect of an investment opportunity due 
diligence. If an investment opportunity came from a trusted source, whether researcher or 
past manager, it was more likely to be considered as a possible investment. In addition, Fried 
and Hisrich (1998) found that none of the investment opportunities that had been assessed by 
the studied Venture Capital firms, originated from unknown sources, whether researcher or 
entrepreneurial manager. In addition, the authors discovered that investment opportunities 
that came from very trusted sources were generally scrutinized less and jumped several steps 
ahead of the decision making process model (Fried and Hisrich, 1994), before they received 
investment funding. In a sense the selection process was based in large part on who was who 
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and whether successful relationships with an investment opportunity ' s management had been 
established in the past. 
Manigart et al. (2000) found a similar trend, when they studied United States Venture Capital 
firms that were part of a larger study that included Venture Capital firms from all over 
Europe. When Manigart et al. (2000) studied the selection criteria of Venture Capitalists in a 
number of countries, including the United States, France, Germany, Holland, Belgium and 
the United Kingdom, they discovered that, aside from Venture Capital firms ' own due 
diligence processes, the number one criterion for investment opportunity selection in the 
United States was based on who the originator of the investment proposal was and the 
relationship the Venture Capital firm had with the potential entrepreneur. 
This focus on management teams when assessing investment opportunities most likely stems 
from who the Venture Capital firm thinks it can trust. The more a Venture Capital firm trusts 
the origin of an investment opportunity, as well as the management that would be directing 
and developing the investment opportunity, the more likely it is that the information the 
Venture Capitalist has been given to assess the opportunity, is trustworthy. This will be 
further explored in the semi-structured interviews and discussion. 
4.4 Risk, Perception Risk and Information Asymmetry 
Risk is considered the degree of uncertainty associated with the outcome of a specific 
behavior (Forlani and Mullins, 2000). Within the field of research that hones in on the 
conceptual dimensions of risk, three main elements of risk have been discussed by Forlani 
and Mullins (2000). These three consist of 1) the recognition of potential losses associated 
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with the risk, 2) the significance of those losses and 3) the uncertainty of whether these losses 
will or will not occur. 
Where risk can be constituted as a measurement, perception risk is a field of cognitive 
research that focuses on the subjective judgment that people make when deciding what 
constitutes high or low risk (Shoemaker, 1990). Generally, it is the study of how much risk 
people are willing to take (Forlani and Mullins, 2000). Perception risk theory has grown over 
the years beginning with its founder, Chauncey Starr (Starr, 1969) whose major finding was 
that people will accept risks 1000 greater if they are voluntary compared to when they are 
involuntary. Many cognitive theories have followed this first statement of perception risk 
where much of the majority of recent research has found that the spread between voluntary 
and involuntary risk taking, is not as great as first stated by Starr (Forlani and Mullins, 2000). 
Cognitive research has also found that risk behavior varies in degree among different groups 
of individuals (Baron, 2004; Baron, 2006). Not surprisingly, entrepreneurs and innovators 
have been found to be some of the individuals that have the highest degree of subjective 
judgment with respect to perception risk and their investment opportunity ideas (Baron, 
2004; Baron, 2006). 
3) Are Venture Capitalists susceptible to perception risks such as information asymmetries 
when choosing life science investment opportunities? 
Generally, information asymmetry is a type of risk which occurs when one party in a 
business sale transaction or negotiation has more information than the other party 
(Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). In the case of Venture Capitalists, perception risk lies 
particularly with how risky the information asymmetry is perceived when discussing an 
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investment opportunity with a new and unknown entrepreneur. Usually the party that is 
selling the opportunity or product knows more about the opportunity or product than the 
buyer or investor. The degree of information asymmetry associated with an investment 
opportunity is unknown to the investor and therefore the risk can be very high. With respect 
to investment opportunities of novel life science technologies, that have difficult to 
understand scientific theories underlying their concepts, the potential for inaccurate 
information to be "sold" to a Venture Capitalist can be perceived as even higher than normal 
(MacMillan et al. , 1987; Patzelt et al., 2006; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002; Zacharakis and 
Meyer, 2000). Venture Capitalists, therefore, who invest in investment of these types, must, 
in a sense, have to have a high tolerance for risk. They must also perceive risk, with respect 
to information asymmetries, as one that can be overcome (Amit et al., 1998; Baum and 
Silverman, 2004; Mullins and Forlani, 2005; Shepherd et al., 2000). 
Patzelt et al., (2006) mention that: 
" ... VC [Venture Capital] portfolio ventures often operate in new industries such as 
the life sciences and employ new business models, where only scarce knowledge and 
experience is available to investors. Since many start-up managers tend to keep the use of 
their limited financial resources and operational problems secret, significant informational 
asymmetries arise between VC firms and their investees. " 
From the viewpoint of the Venture Capitalists, information asymmetry risks must be 
lessened. Fried and Hisrich (1994) discuss the importance of lessening information risk 
through initial selection and investment decision making processes, especially with respect to 
management and technology due diligence. Much research has been conducted on the 
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abilities of Venture Capitalists in avoiding information asymmetry through due diligence 
efforts, but particularly through the relationship formations between entrepreneurs (Forlani 
and Mullin, 2000; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002). Forlani and 
Mullins (2000) as well as Busenitz et al., (2004) suggest that risk can be lessened via the 
selection of the entrepreneur and management team, followed by the relationships that are 
then established after selection has been made. Forlani and Mullins (2000) found that 
entrepreneurs, from 540 firms, had tendencies for taking large degrees of risk, especially 
when new venture endeavours were concerned. Information asymmetry, with new 
entrepreneurs, was also found to be high. This was mainly due to the fact that the level of 
risk that new entrepreneurs were willing to take, were not necessarily known to the investors. 
The authors suggest that investors : 
" ... should consider the degree to which entrepreneurs in whom they choose to invest 
are well-matched to the investors' own risk-taking propensities." (Forlani and Mullins, 2000) 
Other researchers have made similar statements and observations (Amit et al. , 1998; 
Manigart et al. , 2000; Manigart et al. , 2002). If the originator, entrepreneurial or 
management team is known and trusted, there is a feeling by the Venture Capitalists that the 
information asymmetry risk is lessened (Amit et al., 1998; Manigart et al., 2000; Manigart et 
al., 2002). Rejecting proposals for the reason that the originator or entrepreneur is unknown 
is therefore also understandable, especially since the level of information asymmetry risk is 
both unknown and untried. With a new originator or entrepreneur, there may be a lack of 
faith with respect to whether the proposal's information is frank and whether it can actually 
be achieved. 
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Information asymmetry needs to be recognized before it can be perceived as a risk. Manigart 
et al., (2000) state that Venture Capitalists' expertise is established over time as they gain 
more experience. Manigart et al., (2000) suggest that it would therefore not be surprising for 
Venture Capital firms that focus on early stage life science investments, also to have much 
experience with perception risk and the possibility of information asymmetries. Indeed, the 
authors found that United States Venture Capital firms, who have been on the venture stage 
for the longest period of time in the global capital markets, place huge emphasis on selection 
criteria that can lessen the potential of information asymmetries, in particular management 
teams and entrepreneurs. This is especially appreciated when considering that the overall 
United States Venture Capital Industry invests a large proportion of their investments (35%) 
in novel and innovative technologies (Manigart et al., 2000). 
Since Venture Capitalists spend much time evaluating investment proposals, they have also 
been credited with being information asymmetry reducers (Lokett et al., 2002; Shepherd et 
al., 2003; Baum and Silverman, 2004). Literature evidence, however, also shows that 
Venture Capitalists are "human" investors and that they have many demands with the respect 
to the availability of limited resources such as time, expert advisors and historical evaluation 
investment records (Bishop and Nixon, 2006; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002; Shepherd et 
al., 2003). Baum and Silverman (2004) speak specifically to the strategies that Venture 
Capitalists pursue to overcome resource limitations, specifically the predisposition for the 
formation and nurture of investor- entrepreneur/management team relationships. It is 
through these relationships, from investment selection to post monitoring activities, that 
information asymmetry is diminished. It is therefore understandable that Venture Capitalists 
become very reliant on the relationships that they build over the course of their career, 
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knowing who to trust and who not to. New investments opportunities, therefore, that come 
from unknown sources, are therefore also understandably met with less enthusiasm than 
those that come from reliable resources. Unless the Venture Capitalist can invest the time 
and resources into the extra due diligence and relationship formation activities required, a 
new investment opportunity that comes from an unknown originator may, from the Venture 
Capitalist's risk perception point of view, be too risky to invest in. 
To the Venture Capitalist, information asymmetries can therefore easily be avoided by 
choosing originators and management that are known to them. Originator and management 
are also criteria that can be quickly and easily selected for and this, in tum, also prevents 
large efforts in time and resources from being spent. Thus, from the literature reviewed, 
Venture Capitalists are affected by, if not susceptible to, perception risks with respect to 
information asymmetry. Interestingly, it also appears that Venture Capitalists have oriented 
their selection strategy to assist with risk avoidance. 
4.5 Information Asymmetry A voidance Leading to Adverse Selection 
There are potential adverse selection issues, however, associated with the avoidance of 
information asymmetry via the usage of known and trusted management teams. Baum and 
Silverman, (2004) found that investment selection based on the entrepreneur and 
management team criteria has a high propensity for adverse selection that may actually 
increase selection risk; this is especially in the case of funding innovative and entrepreneurial 
technologies. The pool of firms and entrepreneurs that end up being funded by Venture 
Capital firms become limited to a select group of known individuals, an act which, in 
essence, defeats the entire concept of funding innovation and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, 
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Baum and Silverman (2004) state that because only a fraction of established Venture Capital 
portfolio funds succeed, in the first place, the management selection criteria used may 
actually exasperate the risk by limiting choice. 
Since investment decisions appear to be based on management team trust, it is important to 
understand the concept of trust and how it is established. Trust in a particular management 
team is usually established via reputation and Ventura Capital firms ' direct working 
experience and relations with individuals (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Forlani and Mullins, 
2000). Of course, trust is a very qualitative type term, where the basis for trust can be very 
hard to define. Franke et al, (2006) studied twenty-six (26) Venture Capital firms located in 
Munich, Berlin and Vienna, and found some very interesting results. They discovered that 
there are large similarity profile biases between Venture Capital firms and the firms that they 
choose to invest in. When a Venture Capital firm is selecting portfolio start-up firms to 
invest in, particularly with respect to management, the closer the investment opportunity's 
management team profiles resembled that of the Venture Capital firms own management 
team profile, the higher the investment opportunity was rated with the increased likelihood of 
being funded. 
Franke et al, (2006) state that they found Venture Capital investment selection based on 
originator and management troublesome. The emphasis, they state, is not on the actual 
investment opportunity, but on the aspects of the company structure and who will be 
managing the investment firm. In this type of scenario, it is implied that a specific 
management team can be successful, in running any investment opportunity to a certain 
stage, regardless of the opportunity's characteristics or concept. However, the project may be 
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compromised from the beginning, leading to a spectacular failure. This scenario is especially 
exasperated within the biopharmaceutical/life science industry that focuses on the 
development of medicinal therapeutics and where the development and associated time lines 
to bring a new product to a certain stage of development are both long and complex. In this 
type of environment, a Venture Capital backed firm that has been selected purely based on its 
management team, may have a management team that the Venture Capitalist can trust, but if 
the investment opportunity is a "dud" from the beginning, it may not be discovered for a long 
time. Before the "dud" discovery can be made, the Venture Capital firm may have invested 
over and over again in other similar opportunities that have been initiated or recommended 
by the same originator and management team, all of which may be questionable to begin 
with. 
By and large, it has been shown from historical research on Venture Capital firms (Baum and 
Silverman,2004; Franke et al., 2006) that portfolio firms backed by Venture Capitalists have 
both higher and longer survival rates than non Venture Capital supported firms. This does 
not specify, however, whether the Venture backed portfolio firms are simply surviving 
because they are receiving funding from Venture Capital or whether these firms survive 
because their projects are successful. Franke et al. , (2006) as well as Baum and Silverman 
(2004) found that "similarity" biases between the Venture Capital firm and the management 
team of a selected portfolio firm affect the longevity of a portfolio firm, regardless of the 
potential return on investment in the investment proposal. Therefore, it may be that 
longevity of a Venture Capital backed firm is based not so much on the project itself, but the 
relationship between management, the monitoring of the Venture Capital firm and whether 
capital is invested or not. Again this is extremely problematic, especially with respect to life 
50 
science technologies and other such long term investment opportunities. If the focus is on the 
management of the project rather than the technology, the potential for a profitable return on 
investment could be tremendously skewed. Again, it also limits the choice of promising new 
technologies from being invested in. 
The possibility of adverse selection resulting from information asymmetry avoidance is 
therefore one that needs to be considered when understanding Venture Capital selection and 
perception risk. It will be explored further in the semi-structured interviews, results and 
discussion. 
4.6 Education & Experience Leading to Adverse Selection & Overconfidence 
"Experience is not what happens to you. It is what you do with what happens to you. " 
Aldous Huxley (1894-1963) 
As Aldous Huxley intimates, our experiences are linked to our vision and what we will do in 
the future. But whether that experience will enable better future decisions is debateable. 
This highlights the final posed research questions of this study: 
4) Are Venture Capitalists qualified to make investment decisions on new life science 
investment opportunities? 
4a) What are the educational and direct industry experience levels of Venture 
Capitalists? 
4b) Does amount of education and/or experience have an effect on which life science 
investment opportunities are chosen? 
4c) Does a life science investment choice influence future life science investment 
choice? 
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To begin with, Shepherd et al., (2003) debate education and experience in their study on 
Venture Capitalists' experience level and whether more experience leads to reliable 
investment choices. The authors suggest that the more experience a Venture Capitalist has 
the more efficient that individual becomes in keying in on specific objectives. But the authors 
also state that with more experience there is also a tendency to become overconfident, 
performing short cuts to achieve the same objectives. This can be worrisome with respect to 
intricate assessments of investment opportunities that are all very different, potentially 
leading to decreased success rate in investment opportunity selection. That is exactly what 
Shepherd et al. , (2003) found. The authors found that Venture Capitalists with low 
experience levels face vast information burdens because they had less experience with 
decision processes and selection criteria. As experience grew, however, the Venture 
Capitalist was better able to streamline the information burden, relating it back to his/her 
successes with his/her mistakes. But the authors also found that at one point in the 
experience level, the actual experience curve would begin to decline in relation to success 
over time. In these situations, it appeared that overconfidence and heuristic opinions of the 
Venture Capitalist were leading the decision choices. 
Shepherd et al. , (2003) state that Venture Capitalists, who they studied, with more than 
fourteen (14) years of experience were the most susceptible to the downward experience 
curve. The authors found this a concern with respect to investment opportunity selection, if 
older and more senior Venture Capitalists were also the ones that were involved with 
assessing new venture opportunities. The authors also mentioned that by the idiom "you 
cannot teach an old dog new tricks", many United States Venture Capital firms actually 
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place their senior experienced Venture Capitalists in managing roles, rather than in selection 
roles, thereby through promotion, inadvertently avoiding the problem. 
Not only may too much experience be an important perception risk when making opportunity 
investment decisions, but too little experience may be as well. Franke et al., (2006) found 
that adverse selection decisions are also aggravated in that most rejected investment 
opportunities are done early in the process by one person, usually the most junior and 
inexperienced Venture Capitalist within a Venture firm. Junior Venture Capitalists are 
generally those who are placed on early and first screenings of investment opportunities. 
Opportunities for this first screen are generally rejected on such criteria as investment size 
sought, location of proposal firm and stage of finance wanted; however, intellectual property 
and previous experience by the Venture Capital firm with the originator and management 
team of the proposal are also important selection criteria at this stage. Franke et al., (2006) 
also found that the decision to reject was based in large part on whether the management 
team presenting the investment opportunity was similar in character to the inexperienced 
Venture Capitalist. They mention that not only is this perplexing from the point of view in 
selecting worthy investments, but the person who is evaluating investment opportunities may 
also have systematically different selection preferences from the Venture Capital firm that 
he/she was working for. 
This leads back to the research question of whether Venture Capitalists are qualified when 
making investment decisions on new opportunities, especially life science investment 
opportunities. If they are relying on experiences from the past, especially in respect with 
management teams, to decrease investor risk and information asymmetries, are these valid 
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selector criteria? As well, if most of the investment opportunities are rejected early on in the 
selection process and these are rejected by an individual that may be inexperienced, are the 
investment opportunities that are selected the ones that will give the best return on 
investment? 
Some recent research has been directed towards the understanding of whether Venture 
Capitalists are qualified when deciding on investment opportunities and whether the decision 
tools and processes that they use are effective (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Baron, 2004; 
Franke et al., 2006 Shepherd et al., 2000; Shepherd et al., 2003; Zacharakis and Meyer, 
2000). Where Franke et al., (2006) and Baum and Silverman (2004) discuss how Venture 
Capitalists rely on past experiences to select projects, Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) 
discovered that Venture Capitalists rarely use any methods to recall and accurately assess 
how past selection processes and proposals fared. This is imperative because if Venture 
Capitalists are to educate themselves, especially in a particular industry that a Venture 
Capital firm wishes to invest in, a means of objective assessment is necessary. This is 
particularly important in the area of life science where the potential for information 
asymmetries are so large due to the complexity of the projects. Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) 
found that when Venture Capitalists do use decision tools, the risks and weight assigned to 
these analyses may be underweighted if the Venture Capitalist lacks expertise within a 
particular industry. Manigart et al., (2000) established similarly that the decision tools and 
valuation methods that are used by Venture Capital firms vary extensively. Furthermore, 
some of the decision tools used, such as enterprise value methods from traditional companies 
to valuate innovative technology opportunities and the use of internal rates of return on long 
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term technology projects that would have many varying development cycles, were 
completely inappropriate in the assessment of long term technology proposals. 
The focus of Venture Capitalists experience and decision criteria, in particular on 
management teams and entrepreneur characteristics, has also been emphasized in a study 
conducted by Bishop and Nixon (2006). The authors studied pre-nascent entrepreneurs 
(PNEs ), defined as individuals that are engaged in the process of evaluating proposals before 
making development or investment choices. The authors related these PNEs to Venture 
Capitalists, focusing their research specifically on inexperienced PNEs and the types of 
decision criteria they use. They found that there were actually two main sets of criteria that 
PNEs and Venture Capitalists used: espoused criteria and actual criteria, where espoused 
criteria are defined as the perceived criteria that a person believes they use and the actual 
criteria that are used when evaluating a proposal opportunity. Bishop and Nixon (2006) 
discovered that inexperienced PNEs actually made their decision on whether to accept and 
invest in an opportunity before any formal evaluation had really started. Interestingly, the 
authors found that experienced PNEs and Venture Capitalists all used entrepreneur and 
management criteria to evaluate an investment opportunity, with much less emphasis on the 
actual opportunity's business concept and what it was trying to achieve. This was opposite to 
the criteria used by inexperienced PNEs, who they found focused surprisingly more intently 
on the probability of the investment's target market and market acceptance, in other words on 
which the "espoused" criteria were focused. Bishop and Nixon (2006) concluded that as 
more experience was attained with specific investment opportunities and entrepreneurs, 
confidence in decision choices increased with respect to certain scenarios, but information 
sought to select investments, decreased. In this case it appears that the more experience that 
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a Venture Capitalist has, the more reliant he/she is on past experiences, with, in particular 
regard to management and entrepreneurial characteristics. This supports the conclusions 
found by Franke et al (2006), Baum and Silverman (2004) and Shepherd et al., (2003) 
discussed previously. 
Bishop and Nixon's (2006) study corroborates the conclusions of Zacharakis and Shepherd 
(200 1) in which they proposed that the implications of Venture Capitalist overconfidence 
may actually increase the behaviour of confidence in existing information that is easily 
attainable and thereby limit searches for additional information. The authors further discuss 
that this is mainly because of the natural inclination of people to remember past successes 
more clearly than failures . The authors conclude that this would result in the investment of 
opportunities that should perhaps not have been funded and rejecting others that should have 
been funded. This suggests that overconfidence by Venture Capitalists plays a major role in 
how investment selection is performed. 
Another risk that links back to experience and overconfidence is information overload. 
During their research, Zacharakis and Shepherd (200 1) found that 96% of the participating 
fifty-one (51) Venture Capitalists that they studied were overconfident in their ability to 
choose their investment opportunities. The authors found that this overconfidence was 
correlated back to the nature and amount of information that a Venture Capitalist had to 
assess. They state that the more information someone receives when making a decision 
choice, the more the information may contradicts itself. This in tum makes the choice more 
complex and confusing. Interestingly, they discovered that the more information a Venture 
Capitalist received during an investment assessment, and even when the complexity of the 
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decision to reject or accept an investment opportunity increased, the more confident the 
Venture Capitalist generally became in their decision choice. The authors also found that the 
more information that a Venture Capitalist had, the less accurate their decision choices 
became. Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) thus concluded that overconfidence is negatively 
related to Venture Capitalists decision accuracy. Disconcertingly, the authors also found that 
the more unfamiliar an investment opportunity was, the more the Venture Capitalist would 
rely on contingent selection criteria, such as the management team. In a sense, the more 
familiar the Venture Capitalists was with the management team, the more overconfidence the 
Venture Capitalist displayed with respect to investment choice. 
Zacharakis and Shepherd (200 1) also discovered that Venture Capitalists were more 
overconfident in failure predictions than success predictions, but also that the more 
experience a Venture Capitalist had, the less overconfident he/she became in his/her 
predictions. This correlates back to Franke et al. (2006) who found that the least experienced 
Venture Capitalist within the firm usually handles the first rounds of proposal due diligence 
and evaluation. During this process most investment proposals are rejected. If these lesser 
experienced Venture Capitalists, as stated by Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001), also reject 
with high levels of overconfidence, the accuracy of the decision could be considered 
extremely low. 
On another note, Venture Capitalists may have adverse selection techniques with respect to 
selecting life science investment opportunities simply by the fact that these opportunities are 
inherently difficult to understand in the first place. Discovery and design of new life science 
are some of the most intricate concepts to comprehend (Lockett et al., 2002). They are novel 
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and sophisticated and a Venture Capitalist who does not have an educational or work 
experience background within the life science area may be at a disadvantage (Baeyens et al., 
2006; Evans and Nikhil, 2003; Lockett et al., 2002). Advances in the understanding of 
molecular interactions, nanotechnology and/or the human body systems, requires a selector 
who can at least comprehend, partially, which new mechanisms and biotechnologies have a 
chance of working. Amir-Aslani and Negassi (2006) discuss the necessity for and 
importance of life science venture investors to form investment partnerships with individuals 
and firms that have areas of expertise. The authors discuss the desperate need for novel drug 
discovery and how, in many instances the discoveries that are being made are not being 
funded because of associated complexity in understanding the new and forefront technology. 
Amir-Aslani and Negassi (2006) state: 
"It is crucial to understand the nature of change in the industry [life science] and to 
exploit this knowledge by identifying areas where resources should be committed. This way 
the company can focus on product opportunities synergistic within its area of expertise and 
leverage its infrastructure. " 
Shepherd et al., (2002) found that there are links with the educational and industry 
experience that a Venture Capitalist has and those skills that are required to make investment 
decisions. If a Venture Capitalist does not have a scientific or industry background in the 
area of the particular life science opportunity being assessed, he/she may not be able to 
understand the importance of the underlying science involved, nor foresee the potential risks 
that such an investment opportunity may have. If there is a lack of opportunity 
comprehension, valuable life science opportunities are potentially at risk, from the start, of 
not being recognized for funding or at best be commenced with flawed development plans. 
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Investment into a novel life science project, with no baseline, that is both complex and 
difficult to understand, thus may be in large part doomed from the start. 
Venture Capitalists are also hampered in their decision choices by lack of resources, methods 
and processes they use to assess intricate opportunities. This was discussed earlier as factors 
that affect information asymmetry risk. Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) discuss how Venture 
Capitalists can eliminate profitable investments from further consideration due to the adverse 
selection techniques that they use, such as known entrepreneur, or life science they are 
familiar with, simply because they need to keep the evaluation task manageable and on a 
specific time schedule. 
Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) also found that certain types of models and processes help 
Venture Capitalists choose opportunities more accurately. They mention in particular 
actuarial decision aide, simulation and risk assessment models, where investment opportunity 
elements can be itemized into probability parts and reformed into a number or range of 
numbers. The authors found that these models assisted Venture Capitalists to cut down on a 
number of expensive resources, such as assessment time, and yet allow them to objectively 
screen and consider a proposal. The authors furthermore mention that objectivity would 
become more fully realized with such models, reducing adverse selection that can skew 
assessment, such as acquaintance with the entrepreneur and proposal originator. The 
implications of this study suggest that it may be possible to evaluate many complex 
investments in a consistent fashion as opposed to relying on human decision makers that may 
often be influenced by different espoused information that is available among different 
investment proposals. The authors also found that these specific model processes assisted the 
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Venture Capitalists to gauge past projects, enabling them to understand more fully why an 
investment had failed or why it had succeeded. Unfortunately, Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) 
found that very few of the Venture Capitalists that they studied used such methods, processes 
and tools choosing to rely on their intuitive strategies such as comparables, Rules of Thumb 
and management team selection. 
Overall, from the literature assessed and with respect to the perception risks, whether due to 
education or experience at any level, adverse selection or overconfidence, it would appear 
that Venture Capitalists are indeed susceptible to these risks, during investment opportunity 
selection. Further investigation will be conducted via the semi-structured interviews to 
answer the research questions more fully posed in this report, especially with respect to 
whether amount of education and experience has an effect on investment choice and whether 
past investment choices influence future choices. 
4. 7 International Differences in Venture Capital & Opportunity Selection Criteria 
As the Venture Capital Industry becomes increasingly more international with respect to 
funds that are raised and invested in, large differences within and across countries are also 
being noted with respect to valuation approaches of investment proposals, investment 
behaviours ofVenture Capitalists, as well as the information used in the screening and 
selection processes (Bruton, 2003; Manigart et al. , 2000; Yoshikawa et al., 2004). Manigart 
(2000) suggests that in large part this has to do with institutional, legal and cultural 
environments as well as the differences of governance structure and systems. In tum, these 
differences enhance the impacts that countries have on their entrepreneurial businesses, the 
investments that are made and the hurdle rates that the Venture Capitalists seek. 
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In Europe, for instance, where government funding to innovation plays a major role, Venture 
Capital investments are not generally allocated toward early stage firms and only an average 
of two to five percent (2-5%) ofthe Venture Capital investments are dedicated as seed or 
start-up capital (Lockett et al., 2002; Manigart et al. , 2000, 2002). This is quite a small 
number compared to the United States where Venture Capitalists allocate approximately 
thirty-five percent (35%) of its investments into seed/early stage developments (Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994; Manigart et al., 2000). Surprisingly, and most probably due to its government 
funding policies, France is the only country in Europe that comes close to this early stage 
investment strategy where Manigart et al. (2000) found that close to 20% of Venture Capital 
investing is directed to innovation and new start-up firms. Le Bas (2006) also found that this 
was the trend in France, where increasing investments toward innovation, especially within 
the high technology and life science industries, are being made. 
The United Kingdom (UK) Venture Capital market is the next most experienced after the 
United States. Lockett et al. , (2002), however, found that despite increased industry 
experience, as well as improved due diligence techniques for assessing new technology 
investment proposals there exist large selection risks against early stage, innovation 
investment opportunities within the UK Venture Capital market. It appears that UK Venture 
Capitalists are "largely non-technology focused and are mainly governed by management 
buy-outs and other later-stage development activities" (Lockett et al., 2002). 
Where Canadian Venture Capital firms stand in terms of investment priorities and investment 
selection criteria, experience, and education levels, has not been greatly studied. Amit et al. 
(1998) found that when examining Venture Capital firms within Canada, they discovered that 
61 
Canadian Venture Capitalists were large investors of the technology industries, such as life 
science, but at later stages of development, rather than at the earlier entrepreneurial stages. 
The authors found that Canadian Venture Capitalists exited their portfolio firms through 
insider sales and management buy-outs rather than M&As and IPOs -- even during the period 
of the earlyl990 ' s where the markets were rather favourable to IPOs. From the findings that 
Amit et al, (1998) made, it appears that the Canadian Venture market culture portrays 
Canada as one that mimics the UK Venture market rather than the United States. This 
behaviour is interesting when one considers the close proximity of Canada to the United 
States as well as the large financial trade that occurs between the two nations. But as 
Manigart et al. (2000) noted, government structures, as well as the institutional, legal and the 
culture environments of a nation, are much stronger forces in deciding how Venture Capital 
firms operate and invest. From that perspective, Canada is perhaps more strongly linked to 
the UK culture than the United States. This will be explored more fully through the semi-
structured interviews and results, when comparing differences between the interviewed 
Canadian Venture Capitalists and the United States ' Venture Capitalists. 
4.8 Literature Review Summary 
As a summary to the literature review the following major points were discussed in support 
of the main research questions of this project: 
Based on the Fried and Hisrich (1994) model as well as other literature researchers, there 
indeed appears to be common selection criteria used to evaluate potential portfolio 
investment opportunities. There were three (3) major subject areas that Venture Capitalists 
used in selection of portfolio firms to invest in: Business Concept where potential earnings, 
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the business concept, location of investment and intellectual property value are assessed; 
Return on Investment, particularly as to which valuation techniques are used; and 
Management Team where management characteristics, experience and skills are evaluated. 
Through the literature Venture Capital firms indeed use specific valuation methods to 
identify investment opportunities. Aside from demanding extremely high rates of returns 
(100-300%) for life science investments, Venture Capitalists rely on past experience, 
comparables, rules of thumb, and marketing assessments that gives them a sense of what 
similar investments are worth at a specific stage of development (Berlin 1998; Elango et al., 
1995; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Patzelt et al. , 2006; Sahlman 1990). 
With respect to investment opportunities of novel life science technologies, that have difficult 
to understand scientific theories underlying their concepts, the potential for inaccurate 
information to be "sold" to a Venture Capitalist can be perceived as a higher than normal. 
Venture Capitalists who operate within the life science are susceptible to information 
asymmetries, particularly if the entrepreneur or founder of the technology is unknown them 
(MacMillan et al. , 1987; Patzelt et al. , 2006; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002; Zacharakis and 
Meyer, 2000). It was found that Venture Capitalist use known and experienced management 
to partially avoid information asymmetries. It is presumed that by selecting for management, 
the Venture Capitalist is trading high unknown risk for a lower and known risk. 
However, selecting management to avoid information asymmetry can lead to other 
unforeseen risks. A limited and stagnant pool of firms and entrepreneurs may develop, 
where little innovation actually develops. IfVenture Capitalists generate wealth by 
supporting blockbuster innovation, supporting a select core group of individuals does not 
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necessarily assist with creating that wealth. Furthermore, monitoring of management by 
Venture Capitalists has shown to increase longevity of firms. In literature this has been 
associated with the relationships that are built between Venture Capitalists and management. 
But this has not been truly separated out to see if longevity and firm survival is simply related 
to the amount of capital that a Venture Capital firm invests in a firm/entrepreneur in the first 
place. 
As to whether Venture Capitalists are qualified with respect to making investment decisions, 
there was, in the literature, both a debate on the education level as well as on the experience 
level, but particular focus was given to experience. It was found that the learning curve of 
Venture Capitalists is concave, where initially, as experience is gained, the slope of the 
experience curve is upward and to the right. As experience increases the curve begins to taper 
off, as is seen in normal experience curves, but then it seen to decrease downwards. 
Literature links this downward slope with overconfidence. As overconfidence grows, so 
does inaccurate decision making. On the other hand, too little experience has also been 
shown to be an issue, especially since many investment opportunities are initially screened 
by junior Venture Capitalists. 
Education, decision tools and past experience were explored to see how these were perceived 
to effect Venture Capital selection. It appears that Venture Capitalists rely heavily on direct 
experiences, linking these back to their day to day decision choices. The literature finds this 
a bit concerning, since there is a large body on research performed on the fact that people 
have a tendency of remembering successes, and underplaying failures. Decision tools to 
combat these types tendencies, such as re-evaluation synopsis to understand failures, are not 
being used widely by Venture Capitalists. It was also found that the more unfamiliar an 
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investment opportunity was, the more the Venture Capitalist would rely on contingent/actual 
criteria as opposed to espoused selection criteria, such as management team selection. 
Labelling Venture Capitalists as overall highly successful decision makers probably is an 
inaccurate picture. All in all, Venture Capitalists ' qualification most likely depends on the 
individual and that individual's tract record within his or her career. 
Within respect to international differences and since this project is a comparative study 
between West Coast Canada and United States, the literature suggests that there are 
differences with respect to how Venture Capitalists operate and invest. These differences are 
mostly said to be due to governmental and cultural differences between countries, differences 
that mandate how Venture Capitalist firms can and will operate. The literature suggests that 
Canada may operate more on the level of the UK, simply because the governmental system is 
more in line with the UK. However, the US is Canada's only neighbour and it may be that 
our characteristics with respect to gaining wealth are not that different. 
This concludes the literature section of this report. The following sections will state the 
results of the semi-formal interviews, discuss the importance of these results with respect to 
the literature review, and then examine the implications of this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - Analyses and Results 
5.1 Questionnaire Analyses 
Using cold calling technique and e-mailing methods, as described in the methodology 
section, ten (10) Venture Capitalists on the West Coast of Canada from the Vancouver 
region; and nine (9) Venture Capitalists on the West Coast ofUnited States, six (6) from the 
Seattle region and three (3) from California, were contacted and successfully interviewed. Of 
the ten (10) Canadian respondents, two (2) were from the same company and of the nine (9) 
United States respondents, two (2) were from the same company. The interviewing period 
expanded from the end of February, 2007 to mid July, 2007. Most of the Venture Capitalists 
interviewed were Senior Investors and Managers including Principals, Vice Presidents, and 
Partners, who had extremely busy schedules and therefore many time constraints. In order to 
successfully contact these Venture Capitalists, much diligence and patience was taken, with 
many phone calls and e-mails to schedule and re-schedule interviews that could be held to 
ensure the convenience of the Venture Capitalists time. Sometimes it took as long as two 
months to schedule one interview. 
The interview was conducted either face to face or over the telephone with a brief 
introduction of the research that was to be conducted and why. It was aimed that the 
interview last between fifteen and twenty minutes but some of the interviews expanded a 
much longer time period, with the longest lasting almost two hours. Many of the Venture 
Capital respondents spent extra time discussing their positions and opinions. These 
comments and opinions will not undergo any statistical analyses but will be noted in 
comment tables or in the discussion section of this report, where appropriate. 
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Results for each question were collected in an Excel spreadsheet, breaking the responses into 
two groups: West Coast Canada: Vancouver Venture Capitalists and West Coast United 
States: Seattle and California Venture Capitalists. In each group, answers from the Likert 
Scale questions were separated into categories from strongly agree to strongly agree and then 
summed. This is the normal practice for handling Likert Scale type data and Likert Scales 
are often referred to as summary scales (Maurier and Pierce, 1998). The data were considered 
as descriptive data because of small sample sizes. 
Histograms were used to graph and show the differences between the two study groups. 
Where there were large differences between the two groups, Student T -test analyses, 
assuming unequal variances, were used to compare directly between the two groups, for one 
particular category. In some cases, categories of strongly agree and agree or strongly 
disagree and disagree were summed together and then compared between the two study 
groups. In such cases, the Likert Scale data were treated as ordinal data where one cannot 
assume that respondents could perceive the difference between similar adjacent answers. 
Analyses ofVariance was used in such instances to first see ifthere were differences between 
the categories and then Student-T -test for two sample was used assuming unequal 
vanances. 
Chi-square analyses were also attempted, treating the data by placing them into categories of 
accept and reject for West Coast Canada and West Coast United States. Of these analyses, 
sample sizes were generally too small to give any meaningful answers. 
Open ended questions, yes and no questions were summed where possible. If large 
differences were perceived between the two study groups, Student T -test assuming unequal 
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variances were used. General comments, where appropriate were collected in tables. There 
were also many other comments made generally during conversation with individual Venture 
Capitalists. These comments have been used, again where appropriate, in the discussion 
section of this report. 
5.2 Questionnaire Results 
To gather individual respondent background and demographic information, the first few 
questions ofthe semi-formal questionnaire were directed towards experience levels, job 
descriptions and geographical region of choice. Of the respondents from West Coast Canada, 
three (3) of the ten (10) Venture Capitalists interviewed were female and the rest were male. 
In the sample size from West Coast United States, all respondents were male. 
When asked what the responsibilities of their positions were with respect to investment 
selection and evaluation, all respondents replied that they were involved at all levels of 
investment selection process within the firms. A typical answer was that he/she was involved 
in initial calls and opportunity searches, investment proposal reviews, evaluation, investment 
decisions/negotiations and board representation. All of the respondents spent time in active 
monitoring roles within their selected portfolio companies, either observing board practices, 
active on the board, networking, presenting achievements of their portfolios companies and 
in general, assisting portfolio companies in any manner that they could. One of the key 
interesting results from the study was that respondents from the United States (6/9) 
emphasized the importance of the technologies they invested in, especially with respect to the 
newness and the potential for gaining access to ways of meeting unmet medical needs. This 
was not reflected by the Canadian respondents who focused specifically on the roles that they 
performed. In later questions, two of the Canadian respondents did mention that bringing 
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forth technologies which had important medical needs were important to them, but it is 
interesting that the United States respondents mentioned that the technology was an integral 
part of their role as a Venture Capitalist. Table la) gives a summary of all comments with 
respect to the responsibilities of the interviewed Venture Capitalists. Table 1 b) gives a 
summary of comments with respect to previous work experience within the Life Science 
sector. 
When asked how long they had worked within the most recent Venture Capital employer, the 
West Coast Canadian respondents had a combined total of 60 years for all respondents with 
an average of 6 years and a median of 5. 7 5 years per respondent with a range of 2-12 years 
(Figure 1 ). When asked how long in total they had worked as a Venture Capitalist, 
respondents from West Coast Canada had a total of64 years combined, with an average of 
6.4 years per respondent, a median of 6 years per respondent and a range was 3-12 years 
(Figure 1). The West Coast United States respondents, on the other hand, had a total of 
combined years of experience, with most recent Venture Capital employer, of 33.5 years, 
with an average of3.72 years and a median of2 years per respondent with a range of 1-10 
years (Figure 2). When asked how long in total they had worked as a Venture Capitalist, 
West Coast United States, respondents had a combined total of 57 years of experience, an 
average of 6.3 years per respondent, a median of 5 years per respondent and a range of 3-15 
years (Figure 2). Total years worked for most recent employer, for both Canadian and 
United States respondents, is given in Figure 3. 
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Table la. Comments by respondents on Venture Capital roles and responsibilities with respect to 
Investment Opportunity Evaluation. 
West Coast Canada: Vancouver(n=lO) 
1 
All stages of investment: initial calls; proposal reviews; evaluation; investment decisions and 
Board representation. 
2 
Evaluate new investments; play active role in portfolio companies--monitoring the companies; 
some board participation; networking; assisting portfolio companies; presenting at conferences. 
3 
I am VP of investments. I seek, negotiate, evaluate and finalize investment deals with start-up 
companies. I oversee our investments in terms that I am either on the Board or an observer of the 
Board in each of the companies that have been invested in. 
4 
As CFO and Investment Manager I oversee investments, make recommendations and sit on the 
Board of Directors for XXX. 
5 
I am CEO; choose and assess new opportunities; sit on Board of Directors. 
6 
Typical role of a VC middle manager: sourcing proposals; evaluation of proposals; raising funds 
for proposals; representative on the Board of Directors of portfolio firms 
7 
Sourcing; evaluating; making investments; matrix organization and now managing XXX. 
8 
Started as a portfolio investor in ventures -- set up the life science portfolios, set up support staff; 
set up teams of assessment people; due diligence and Board attendance. 
9 
I am VP of investments in Vancouver. I seek, negotiate and finalize investment deals with start-
up companies. I have to meet federal and provincial criteria fund criteria. I operate 5 different 
funds and oversee them in terms as that I am either on the Board or an observer of the Board in 
each of the companies that have been invested in. 
10 
From sourcing, evaluating to managing investments. 
West Coast United States: Seattle and California (n=9) 
1 
Manager. Selection of novel technologies for unmet medical needs; due diligence, Board 
presence 
2 
CEO and Investment Partner. Selection, due diligence and Board presence either directly or as an 
observer. Constantly searching for new ways of doing things better to fmd solutions to unmet 
medical needs. 
3 
Principal of XXX; everything; deal assessment and selection; setting teams up for new portfolio 
companies and monitoring current portfolio companies. This company is new on the coast and 
Board positions have not yet been established---looking for companies to invest in. 
4 
Partner. From evaluation all the way to sitting and board representation. Always looking for 
technologies that will bring newness to the field of life sciences. 
5 
Evaluate new businesses-due diligence; working with current portfolio companies as observer on 
Boards. 
6 
Member of a 4 person team. Diligence and research into investment opportunities; Less on 
Boards. 
7 
Partner-sourcing, due diligence, negotiations, Board representation; as well as assist other 
principles with due diligence. Finding ways of bringing forth incredible new technologies 
8 
Principal with the healthcare investment team searching for unrnet medical needs. Investing 
partner, who searches, analyzes and invest in opportunities. Board representation. 
9 
General Partner: select, assess, invest and sit on Boards to drive. Always searching for the most 
provocative new technologies available. 
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Table lb. Respondents previous work experience within the Life Science Sector. (N/A equates no 
previous experience in Life Science Sector). 
West Coast Canada: Vancouver (n=lO) 
1 
N/A 
2 
Project Management and BD- I year 
3 
Research Lab Technician - 1 year 
4 
N/A 
5 
Founder and CEO - 10 years 
6 
Senior Scientist - 2 years 
7 
N/A 
8 
N/A 
9 
Lab technician, BD and Marketing - 5 years 
10 
Founder and CEO -5 years 
West Coast United States: Seattle and California (n=9) 
1 
Researcher - 5 years 
2 
N/A 
3 
Business Development -5 years 
4 
Entrepreneur and founder - 17 years 
5 
General management, sales and marketing - 5 years 
6 
N/A 
7 
Senior manager of BD- 3.5 years 
8 
Business Development - 8 years 
9 
Founder and CEO - 20 years 
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Figure 1. Total Years with Current Venture Capital Employer Compared to Total Years of Venture 
Capital Experience for West Coast Canadian (Vancouver) Venture Capitalists (n=IO). 
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Figure 2. Total Years with Current Venture Capital Employer Compared to Total Years of Venture 
Capital Experience for West Coast United States (Seattle/California) Venture Capitalists (n=9) 
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Figure 3. Total Years With Current Venture Capital Employer for West Coast Canadian (n=lO) and 
West Coast United States (n= 9) Venture Capitalists. 
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When comparing total years of previous life science experience, Canadian Venture Capital 
respondents had a total of 24 years combined experience, an average of 2.4 years and a 
median of 1 year compared to United States respondents who had a total of 63.5 years 
combined experience, an average of7 years and a median of5 years (Figure 4). 
When asked what their level of completed education was, 100% of respondents from both 
countries had completed High School and had a University undergrad degree. Aside from 
their Undergrad degrees, 20% of the Canadian Venture Capitalists had technical or 
professional degrees such as in engineering, law or medicine, 20% had Master degrees, 10% 
had PhDs and 70% had MBA degrees. With respect to the United States Venture Capitalists, 
33% had technical or professional degrees, 22% had Master degrees, 44% had PhDs and 44% 
had MBA degrees (Figure 5). The major difference between the two countries was the PhD 
and MBA categories where there were more Venture Capitalists from the United States who 
had PhDs and more Venture Capitalists from Canada that had MBA degrees status. It is 
interesting to note that of all 19 respondents combined from both countries, 11 of the 
respondents had MBA degrees, that being 58% of the sample size. 
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Figure 4. Previous Experience in a Life Sciences Company for West Coast Canadian (n=lO) and West 
Coast United States (n= 9) Venture Capitalists. 
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Figure 5. Level of Education Completed for West Coast Canadian (n=lO) and West Coast United States 
(n= 9) Venture Capitalists. 
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The Venture Capital respondents were asked whether they or their companies invested 
outside of their geographic region, specifically outside of their province, state or country. The 
West Coast United States respondents were significantly more inclined to invest outside of 
their geographic region with a significance Student 's T-test: two-tail P(T<=t) of0.036 than 
the Canadian respondents (Figure 6) This was particularly the case with respect to European 
and Asian investment (Figure 7). 60% of the Canadian Venture Capitalists operated funds 
that mandated British Columbian investment within the life sciences. The Canadian 
respondents were more inclined to invest within Canada than within the United States and the 
United States respondents were more inclined to invest within the United States than the 
Canadian respondents. 
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Figure 6. Investment in Life Science Proposals Located Outside of Company's Geographic Region for 
West Coast Canadian (n=lO) and West Coast United States (n= 9) Venture Capitalists. 
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Figure 7. Global Regions for Life Science Investment by West Coast Canadian (n=lO) and West Coast 
United States (n= 9) Venture Capitalists. 
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A series of six questions were asked with respect to screening life science investment 
opportunities and the respondent's strategy. The first question of this series asked whether 
there was a focus on specific life science industries, such as drug development versus device. 
The United States respondents (8/9) were more inclined to strongly agree and agree than the 
Canadian respondents (7/10), but there were no significance between the two groups. 
Combining the two study groups, there was a strong trend of agreement against disagreement 
with fifteen (15) of the respondents both strongly agreeing/agreeing and only four (4) ofthe 
Venture Capital respondents both disagreeing/strongly disagreeing (Figure 8). 
The second question of the series asked whether there was a focus on specific life science 
technologies such as single agent small molecules, biologics, nanotechnology etc. , when 
screening investment opportunities. It was found that 70% of the United States respondents 
agreed/strongly agreed compared to 20% of the Canadian respondents (Figure 9). 
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Figure 8. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that they focused on Specific Life Science 
Industries when Screening Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada (n=lO) and West 
Coast United States (n= 9) 
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Figure 9. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that they focused on Specific Life Science 
Technologies when Screening Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada (n=IO) and West 
Coast United States (n= 9). 
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The third question of the series asked whether there was a focus on specific disease 
indications, such as diabetes, cancer, or heart disease, when screening investment 
opportunities (Figure 1 0). It was found that twelve (12) of all the respondents disagreed with 
this strategy. Three (3) of the ten (1 0) respondents from Canada, however, did agree that 
there was a specific disease indication focus when screening investment proposals. 
The fourth question of the series asked whether there was a focus on preferred stage of 
technology development when screening investment opportunities (Figure 11 ). This question 
received a wide spread of responses with eleven (11) of the total nineteen (19) respondents 
either strongly agreeing or agreeing. 
The fifth question of the series asked whether there was a focus on geographical location of 
the investment opportunity when screening investment opportunities (Figure 12). It was 
found that fourteen (14) out of all respondents either strongly agreed/ agreed that 
geographical location of the investment opportunity was a focus. 
The sixth and final question of the series asked whether there was a focus on minimum or 
maximum investment required to exit when screening investment opportunities (Figure 13). 
It was found that 90% of United States respondents agreed or strongly agreed compared to 
50% the Canadian respondents. Comments from five of the Canadian respondents addressed 
that minimum and maximum investment was not a focus because it depended on the fund 
rather than the technology being assessed. 
80 
Figure 10. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that they focused on Specific Disease Indications 
when screening Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada (n=10) and West Coast United 
States (n= 9) 
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Figure 11. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that they focused on a Preferred Stage of 
Technology when Screening Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada (n=10) and West 
Coast United States (n= 9) 
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Figure 12. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that they focused on a Preferred Geographic 
Location when Screening Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada {n=lO) and West 
Coast United States {n= 9) 
90% 
80% 
70% 
~60% 
Yso% 
~0% 
f,3o% 
20% 
10% 
0% +-~~----~~-
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree 
c West Coast Canada: Vancouver 
•West Coast United States: Seattle 
and California 
Figure 13. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that they focused on the Minimum or Maximum 
Investment Required to Exit when Screening Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada 
(n=lO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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The respondents were asked what main investment strategies were used when screening life 
science opportunities (Figure 14). It is important to note that for this question, the 
respondents were able to identify more than one strategy. Of the five identified categories, 
management, return on investment, location, stage of development and the technology itself, 
three strategies, management, stage and technology, were mentioned by eighteen ( 18) of the 
nineteen ( 19) respondents, with only one respondent mentioning return and none of the 
respondents mentioning location. Of the three mentioned categories, the United States 
Venture Capitalists responded comparably stronger, with four (4) out of the nine (9) 
respondents giving more than one response, whereas the Canadian Venture Capitalists 
responded by mainly giving one strategy, with only one respondent giving more than one 
strategy. Of the three main strategies selected, management, stage and technology, the 
United States respondents used technology as a selection strategy much more than the 
Canadian respondents. 
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Figure 14. Main Factors Considered by Venture Capitalists when Screening Investment Opportunities. 
West Coast Canada (n=lO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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The respondents were next asked four questions with respect to criteria used when screening 
investment opportunities. These included financial , potential market size, intellectual 
property, and management team criteria. Firstly the respondents were asked whether 
financial criteria are important to estimate potential proposal worth, during initial screening 
of investment opportunities (Figure 15). Almost 100% of the respondents (18119) replied 
that they either strongly agreed or agreed that the financial criteria were important. The 
respondents were then asked if potential market size criteria are important when screening 
investment opportunities (Figure 16). Here again 100% of the respondents (19119) either 
strongly agreed or agreed. In this case and interestingly, the United States respondents were 
more likely to state that they strongly agreed and the Canadian respondents were more apt to 
state that they agreed rather than strongly agreed. The respondents were next asked whether 
intellectual property is important when screening investment opportunities (Figure 17). In 
this case fifteen (15) of the respondents strongly agreed, with three (3) respondents simply 
agreeing. One Venture Capitalist from the United States neither agreed nor disagreed. 
Respondents were finally asked whether management team and skill was important when 
screening investment opportunities (Figure 18). Here 100% of the United States respondents 
strongly agreed. Canadian respondents also strongly agreed, but two (2) of the respondents 
simply agreed. 
The respondents were asked whether it is important to exclude investment opportunities that 
had unclear regulatory guidelines and risks. Interestingly 67% of the United States Venture 
Capital respondents either strongly agreed or agreed compared to 30% of the Canadian 
respondents and 40% ofthe Canadian correspondents disagreed (Figure 19). 
85 
Figure 15. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Financial Criteria are important to 
estimate potential value of Investment Opportunity. West Coast Canada (n=l 0) and West 
Coast United States (n= 9) 
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Figure 16. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Potential Market Size is important when 
screening Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada (n=IO) and West Coast United 
States (n= 9) 
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Figure 17. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Intellectual Property Status is important 
when screening Investment Opportunity. West Coast Canada (n=10) and West Coast United 
States (n= 9) 
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Figure 18. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Management Team and Their Skills are 
Important when screening Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada (n=10) and West 
Coast United States (n= 9) 
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The respondents were asked whether it is important to exclude investment opportunities that 
carry negative public opinion such as foetus stem cell research, genetically modified 
organisms etc (Figure 20). Captivatingly, the Canadian respondents (7/10) agreed that it was 
important to exclude these types of investment opportunities compared to the United States 
respondents (6/9). With respect to this question, the comments given by the respondents 
were quite different between the two countries, (Table 2) where three (3) of the Canadian 
respondents mentioned that Venture Capitalists were risk adverse, did not want to be tainted 
by bad news, or simply that because their funds were supported by the Canadian government, 
they had an ethical responsibility of not being involved with investment opportunities which 
were perceived as unethical by the public. Comments from two of the United States 
respondents reflected the emphasis on attempts to first overcome any public negativity and 
then deciding whether to move forwards, especially if the investment opportunity had good 
potential for great returns. One of the Canadian respondents concurred with this sentiment. 
However, one United States respondents also mentioned that even though, generally, he 
would not consider this an issue, if the investment opportunity was "too hot to handle" it 
may be difficult to exit such an opportunity. 
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Figure 20. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that it is important to exclude Investment 
Opportunities that carry Negative Public Opinion. West Coast Canada (n=lO) and West 
Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Table 2. Respondents' General Comments with Respect to the Importance of Excluding Investment 
Opportunities that Carry Negative Public Opinion. West Coast Canada (n=4) and West Coast 
United States (n= 2). 
West Coast Canada: Vancouver 
Agree Because fund is financed by the Canadian government, there is a burden of responsibility for 
ethical investment. 
Disagree Balance- what is the exit strategy- if the negative public opinion technology is still a good deal, 
then still invest. 
Agree VCs are somewhat risk adverse and don't want to be tainted by bad press 
Agree Government funded 
West Coast United States: Seattle and California 
Disagree Try to overcome any negativity and then decide whether to move forwards or not. 
Disagree Generally no, but could possibly impact the chance of successful exist -- too bot to handle- need 
to assess. 
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Respondents were asked whether it is important to exclude investment opportunities that are 
scientifically difficult to understand. Canadian respondents were spilt in opinion, with 50% 
agreeing and 50% neither agreeing nor disagreeing or simply disagreeing. United States 
respondents were also split on this question, but tended to strongly agree, 33%, rather than to 
simply agree (Figure 21). Respondents' comments can be viewed in Table 3. 
A series of questions were asked with respect to life science investment opportunity valuation 
methods and whether methods were considered good, where "good" was defined as adequate 
or acceptable. The first question asked whether respondents considered Discounted Cash 
Flow methods, as good methods for assessing the value of life science proposals (Figure 22). 
Canadian respondents were more inclined to neither agree nor disagreed and United States 
respondents were more inclined to state that they either disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
The next question asked whether simulation models, such as Monte Carlo, are good valuation 
methods for life science investment proposals (Figure 23). In this case there were mixed 
opinions from the Canadian respondents, but 8 out of the 9 respondents from United States 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed. The respondents were then asked whether multiples, 
such as Price Earning Multiples, were good valuation methods for life science investment 
proposals (Figure 24). More than 50% ( 11119) of all respondents either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed that these multiples were useful. A number ( 4/9) of the United States respondents 
mentioned that they neither agreed nor disagreed. They mentioned that this method was 
particular good for later stage development, particularly in the case of medical device 
technologies. 
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Figure 21. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that it is important to exclude Investment 
Opportunities that are Scientifically Difficult to Understand. West Coast Canada (n=IO) and 
West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Table 3. Respondents Comments Regarding the Importance of Excluding Investment Proposals that are 
Scientifically Difficult to Understand. Comment was not required on this Likert Scale question. 
West Coast Canada: Vancouver: 6 respondents' comments 
Agree If business plan is poor; A person who wants a VC to invest can always simplify a difficult 
project - yes I would agree; 
Agree Yes, certain fields of medicine and life science do not have a clear scientific basis and should be 
excluded such as alternative medicines and herbal medicines. 
Agree Re-craft the idea and get the message across. 
Agree If a scientist can't explain, after several times, the story, then most likely won't invest 
Neither Sitting down with the founding scientist is important, both to build a relationship, but also to get 
Agree nor a handle on the technology. But it takes time to develop a trusting relationship and that is not 
Disagree always easy." 
West Coast United States: Seattle and California: 2 respondents' comments 
Disagree One can always get assistance from key opinion leaders and other scientists. Novel technologies 
are not always easy to understand. 
Strongly Why invest in something that doesn't make sense. 
Agree 
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Figure 22. 
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methods for assessing Life Science Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada (n=lO) and 
West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Figure 23. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Simulation Models are good valuation 
methods for assessing Life Science Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada (n=lO) and 
West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Figure 24. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Multiples such as Price Earning Multiples 
are good valuation methods for Life Science Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada 
(n=IO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Finally respondents were asked whether technology market value assessments, such as for a 
particular disease indication, are good qualitative valuation methods for life science 
investment opportunities (Figure 25). All United States respondents strongly agreed or 
agreed that market assessments were good valuation methods, compared to Canadian 
respondents in the same categories, where only 60% of the Canadian respondents also 
agreed. 
Respondents were then asked which other valuation techniques were used (Figure 26). Some 
of the respondents mentioned that Enterprise Value and Payback Period were used, but 100% 
of the respondents mentioned Comparables as the preferred method. Respondents were then 
asked which evaluation techniques they had found to be the most useful when evaluating life 
science investment opportunities (Figure 27). All respondents, 100%, found that 
Comparables were the most useful with 42% (8/19) of the respondents also mentioning Rules 
of Thumb. When respondents were asked whether they felt that current valuation methods 
are adequate at evaluating life science investment opportunities, 58% of the respondents 
agreed (Figure 28). Again, some of the respondents mentioned that when the current 
valuation methods were used, they provided a "sanity check" as to what an investment 
opportunity was worth. It was mentioned by one of the United States respondents that in 
essence these are the techniques that are available, but in reality an investment opportunity is 
worth only what people are willing to pay and what the market can bear. Comments can be 
viewed in Table 4. 
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Figure 25. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Technology Market Assessments are good 
qualitative valuation methods for Life Science Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada 
(n=lO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Figure 26. Valuation Techniques used by Venture Capitalists to evaluate Life Science Investment 
Opportunities. West Coast Canada (n=lO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Figure 27. Valuation Methods found to be most useful by Venture Capitalists evaluating Life Science 
Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada (n=IO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Figure 28. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Current Valuation Methods are adequate 
when evaluating Life Science Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada (n=lO) and West 
Coast United States (n= 9). 
70% 
60% 
50% 
"' 0 
> 40% -c: Ql 
30% u ... 
Ql 
11. 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither Disagree 
97 
0 West Coast Canada: Vancouver 
• West Coast United States : Seattle 
and California 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Table 4. Respondent comments: adequacy of current Life Science Investment Opportunity valuation 
methods. Comment was not required for this Likert Scale Question (n=8). 
West Coast Canada: Vancouver- 4 respondents' comments. 
Neither Comparables are the only really good ones for life science 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree Use what we have and this is all we have. 
Agree Different ways--start to finish --- models --- strategy for ensuring that pieces are not left out -
conception models and road maps for moving forwards 
Agree More for a sanity check-absolutely imperfect- supply and demand dependent- but it is important 
to use the numbers as a form of check and balance; sanity. Depends on the market variables. 
West Coast United States: Seattle and California- 4 respondents' comments. 
Agree comparables---sanity check 
Disagree Not enough solid valuation methods to use that can predict the uncertainty that is experienced 
when assessing proposals 
Neither Only things we have at this time. 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree These are the ones that we have and I have been using for the past 10 years. Truly it is about 
what people are willing to pay and supply and demand. 
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Respondents were asked about investment choices and direct selection preferences. Almost 
100% of the all the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that past investment choices 
influenced future investment choices (Figure 29). When respondents were asked whether 
they tended to select investment opportunities that were related to their educational/work 
background, 63% of the respondents (12/ 19) either strongly agreed or agreed (Figure 30). 
When asked about whether they tended to choose/select investment opportunities that were 
similar to past successes over those proposals that were not, 60% of all respondents either 
strongly agreed or agreed, and 30% neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 31 ). Interestingly 
75% of the United States respondents either strongly agreed or agreed, whereas 40% ofthe 
Canadian respondents simply agreed. Also, 40% of the Canadian respondents neither agreed 
nor disagreed. Three (3) of the Canadian respondents mentioned that they chose this 
category because it was easy to become "biased" and complacent with respect to this type of 
decision making and that it was important to "keep one's eye on the ball to changing 
variables". When respondents were asked whether life science investment opportunities 
were more difficult to assess than other types of investment opportunities (e.g. high-tech 
proposals), 30% of Canadian respondents agreed whereas 60% of United States respondents 
agreed (Figure 32). Overall 52% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed. 
Interestingly 60% of the Canadian respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. Respondents 
were also asked whether Venture Capital experience/expertise is positively linked to 
successful investment selection (Figure 33). Of all the respondents, 90% either strongly 
agreed or agreed. United States respondents strongly agreed compared to Canadian 
respondents who simply agreed. 
99 
Figure 29. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Past Investment Choices Influenced Future 
Investment Choices. West Coast Canada (n=IO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Figure 30. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that they tended to select Life Science 
Investment Opportunities related to their educational background over opportunities that 
were not related. West Coast Canada (n=IO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
50% 
45% 
40% 
, 35% 
u 30% > 
'E 
Gl 
25% 
~ 20% 
Gl 
D.. 15% 
10% 
5% 
0% 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
o West Coast Canada: Vancou~.er 
• West Coast United States: Seattle and / 
California 
Disagree 
100 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Figure 31. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that they tended to select Life Science 
Investment Opportunities similar to past successes over those which are not. West Coast 
Canada (n=lO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Figure 32. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Life Science Investment Opportunities are 
more difficult to assess than other types of Investment Opportunities. West Coast Canada 
(n=lO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Figure 33. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Venture Capital expertise/experience is 
positively linked to successful investment selection. West Coast Canada (n=IO) and West 
Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Respondents were asked what overall hurdle rate of return they expected from successful life 
science investments, where successful was defined as being better than average. The 
responses were varied, ranging from 10% to 1000% rates of return, but the majority (70%) of 
the respondents replied that a hurdle rate of 30%-70% was a reasonable return to expect. 
When asked what proportions of their investments they expected, in the long run, to reach a 
successful exit, the typical response was "all of them, of course". When asked what realistic 
proportion of their investments reached a successful exit, the majority of the respondents 
replied that between 10-30% of their investment were successful, with approximately 50% of 
investments giving minimal returns. See Table 5 and 6 for comments. 
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Table 5. Canadian respondents' comments with respect to the expected Hurdle Rate of Return and the 
proportion of investments expected to reach a successful Exit (respectively). 
West Coast Canada: Vancouver Respondents (n=IO) 
1 
Hurdle Rate: 40% minimum 
75% expect 
30% reality: target IRR 
2 
Hurdle Rate: 30% minimum 
30% ---- 100% for really successful 
3 
Hurdle Rate: We have a hurdle rate of return of between 30-60% depending on the project. 
10% big wins; 20% craters-failures; 20% modest to little returns; 40% considered average. 
4 
Hurdle Rate: 30% for Portfolio or 25x per individual project 
25% successful-making lots of money. 
5 
Hurdle Rate: Multiples of 5-10 times or 25%; but have received multiples of 24 times; 272%; 
XXX best deal has been 270% IRR. 
2110-20% success; would like 3-4/10 or 30-40% ... but not reality. 
6 
Hurdle Rate: 30% - internal rate of return. 
20-60-20; therefore 20% should be successful 
7 
Hurdle Rate: Minimum 40% IRR 
20% 
8 
Hurdle Rate: 30%- blended --- IRR 50% 
15% 
9 
Hurdle Rate: 35% return on investment. Set by IRR target. 
All of them of course. Out of the 18 companies that we have invested in--3 have been outright 
failures. 
10 
Hurdle Rate: 3 times- endpoint--300% add in time constant. 
20% 
Table 6. United States Respondents' comments with respect to the Expected Hurdle Rate of Return and 
the proportion of investments expected to reach a successful Exit (respectively). 
West Coast United States: Seattle and California Respondents {n=9) 
1 
Hurdle Rate: Not able to answer that 
25% 
2 
Hurdle Rate: 30% later---60-70% early stage 
All of them - but realistically 20% 
3 
Hurdle Rate: 11X/ 3X--- 4-5X 
All of them--90% in the past few years; 10% realistically 
4 
Hurdle Rate: To make money - 30% 
Of course you hope for all of them; realistically 10% 
5 
Hurdle Rate: 3x-300% 
30-50% in the past few years-----20% realistically 
6 
Hurdle Rate: IRR 30% and above for biopharmaceutical; 3x for other types such as devices. 
80% in the last 4 years 
7 
Hurdle Rate: 2-3x 
Rule of thumb -10%-20% ;25% 
8 
Hurdle Rate: High multiple ; cash on cash return 
2-3 out of 10 will succeed; 5-6 will be average or break even; 2 will fail 
9 
Hurdle Rate: 3-6x 
50% 
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Respondents were asked what they considered as the most desirable exit route for life science 
investments (Figure 34). All respondents, 100%, replied that M&A had been, in the recent 
past, the most desirable route of choice. All respondents also commented that exit routes 
depended on market conditions, highlighted by four ( 4) of the United States respondents who 
explained that because M&A and IPOs depended on market conditions and interest rates, exit 
routes were continuously changing. Four (4) of the 40% of the Canadian respondents 
considered IPOs as desirable exit routes, but only 10% of the United States respondents 
found this route desirable. With respect to IPOs, two (2) of the United States respondents 
commented that they considered them more as a refinancing option than an exit route. 
General comments were directed towards the stock market volatility in technology stocks, the 
length of time it took for an IPO financing period, the paying off of underwriters and 
generally the long waiting game of getting one's money back out of the market. As one of 
the United States respondents mentioned: 
"JPOs are one big headache right now, because of the market swings and the 
uncertainty. A lot of the bigger pharmaceutical companies are currently searchingfor 
technology to augment their pipelines and therefore there are still lots of opportunities for 
M&As" 
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Figure 34. Most desirable Exit Routes for Life Science Investments. West Coast Canada (n=IO) and 
West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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The respondents were also asked how long they expected to wait in order for an investment 
to return capital (Figure 35). The majority of the respondents (90%) replied within two 
categories: 3-5 years and 5-7 years, with four of these respondents replying 3-7 years. 
Interestingly, 50% of Canadian respondents, after picking a specific time range for 
investment, were willing to wait longer than 7 years. This was not the case with the United 
States respondents. Respondents were asked what they thought were some of the key 
challenges Venture Capitalists had in terms of selecting life science opportunities to invest in. 
The responses were compiled into six main categories: financial efficiency challenges, 
management team challenges, technological evaluation challenges, opportunities availability 
challenges, future trends and risk challenges and finally deal processing/negotiation 
challenges (Figure 36). Of note, the main challenge was management teams (12 responses), 
technological evaluation (9 responses), opportunities availability and future trends and risks 
(7 responses each). Canadian respondents (4 responses) were also concerned with deal 
processing/negotiation challenges. With respect to opportunity availability challenges, these 
were more pronounced with the Canadian respondents than the United States. The United 
States respondents were more concerned about future trends and unforeseen risks than the 
Canadian respondents. For a complete list of all respondents comments please peruse Figure 
36 and Table 7. 
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Figure 35. Venture Capitalist's expectations for Time Period between Initial Investment to Capital 
Return. West Coast Canada (n=lO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Figure 36. Key Challenges in selection of Life Science Investment Opportunities by Venture Capitalists. 
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Table 7. Respondents' comments with respect to the Key Challenges in terms of Selecting Life Science 
Investment Opportunities. 
West Coast Canada: Vancouver Responses (n=lO) 
1 
1. Independence, experience of management team: are they experienced in medical and clinical 
understanding and timelines. 2. Ability to attract the talent and build good management teams for 
companies who will be or are part of the fund portfolio- how does one attract good management; 
acting almost like a recruitment agency; 3. Valuating the probability of management to execute 
on agreed upon timelines. 
2 
Evaluating management and assessing people qualifications; Evaluating the technology and 
finding_ an expert that can assist with evaluation---and then the overall evaluation. 
3 
People--especially people that are not experienced. Also cash efficiency--some firms are 
managed inefficiently and expensively. 
4 
Limited deal float-limited opportunities available. 
5 
Understanding future trends; understanding fmancing plan and attracting good management 
teams, opportunities available. 
6 
Processing of deals : the deal is not truly closed until final closure occurs. This is a frustrating 
time because everyone is nervous and there could be potential last minute scuttles if for instance 
there is a syndication pull-out or fund oversubscription. Another important point is getting 
everyone onto the same page and agreement w.r.t. a proposal-this can be very challenging 
sometimes: both externally and internally. 
7 
Creating deal flow attractiveness; capability of assessing the technology-diligence- external 
expertise-to have the ability to process things to a decision point and move from there. 
8 
Science, data, people; competing forces; goal posts shifting constantly. 
9 
Understanding the technology and the risks that are involved with the technology--this can be 
very difficult. There are also a lot of challenges with IP and a lot of grey areas. Understanding 
the development pathways of the technology and clinical program that it should be involved with 
can only be truly conducted using trusted management teams who are proficient and have 
experience. 
10 
Finding good opportunities. 
West Coast United States: Seattle and California Responses (n=9) 
1 
Nuances between the similar technologies and gauging what makes one technology better than 
another one. 
2 
Evaluation and finding appropriate management teams 
3 
The quality of the management team is the most important challenge. 
4 
Unmet medical needs-regulatory environment - uncertainties 
5 
Risk- the unsolvable risks that cannot always be predicted for. Risks are hard to mitigate. 
6 
Management; IP; market size- risk reward profile. 
7 
Finding the right technologies to invest in; finding good opportunities; science is hard; regulatory 
and scientific risks etc; management. Guessing right on the science; addressing all the risks and 
issues and watching the ball to see where it is rolling into the future. 
8 
Finding a good management team. Then the next is clinical and regulatory risk and strategy; 
then getting your money worth. 
9 
Good people are the most challenging to fmd and then the obtaining of good technology. 
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Respondents were asked whether they would or would not invest in a difficult to understand 
life science investment opportunity. The majority (90%) ofUnited States respondents 
strongly agreed/agreed compared to Canadian respondents, who agreed 60% ofthe time. Of 
note, 30% of the Canadian respondents disagreed (Figure 37). 
Two questions were asked with respect to success rate and capital expenditures required 
when developing life science from the concept stage to market (Figure 38 and 39). These 
questions were asked to gain further insight on the debate of why so many life science 
initiatives may fail. Both the Canadian and the United States respondents appeared mixed in 
their opinions but Canadian respondents had a large minority that disagreed (30% and 40% 
respectively). Comments given by Canadian respondents include: " ... !am highly suspicious 
of the statistics that surround these numbers."; "We have assisted in helping very virtual and 
small companies become established, companies that have not had to pay large 
infrastructure costs etc. " Comments, on the other hand, that were given by United States 
respondents include: "When taking into account the huge infrastructure costs and the large 
data banks that are filled with unsuccessful molecules and entities, then yes I agree to both of 
these questions. "; "I believe that these numbers have most probably been very well 
researched and highlight the rarity of success within the life sciences, particularly in 
biopharmaceuticals. " 
Final comments were asked of the respondents. Only nine (9) of the respondents commented. 
Table 8 gives the range of these comments. 
110 
Figure 37. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who would not invest in a difficult to understand Life 
Science Investment Opportunity. West Coast Canada (n=lO) and West Coast United States 
(n= 9). 
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Figure 38. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that the success rate of Life Science 
Commercialization is one in 10,000 molecules (Including Failures). West Coast Canada 
(n=lO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
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Figure 39. Percentage of Venture Capitalists who agreed that Life Science Development Costs 
(Biotechnology), from concept to market, are close to $800 million USD. West Coast Canada 
(n=lO) and West Coast United States (n= 9). 
50% 
45% 
40% 
VI 35% 
0 
30% > 
'E 25% 
Q) 
~ 20% 
Q) 
15% a. 
10% 
5% 
0% 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither Disagree 
112 
D West Coast Canada: Vancouver 
• West Coast United States: Seattle and 
California 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Table 8. Final Comments from Respondents (n=9). 
West Coast Canada: Vancouver Responses (5) 
1 
When someone approaches VCs with a prospective proposal, timing is everything. A big 
problem with new management teams is the lack of relationship building that occurs when 
setting up initial companies; these relationships with VCs need to be nurtured. Future 
commitments to a proposal/company are not given and that is not because VCs don't want to 
commit, but because they can't due to other priorities or fund criteria. If a VC does not know 
where a company is going/heading with respect to future initiatives, it is hard to request the VC 
to be a backer. 
2 
Canadian VCs tend to invest in earlier rounds offmancing than US VC---US will generally 
invest in later stages and rounds. 
3 
People like to invest in what they are comfortable with because they have to have hands on 
experience and sit on the majority of boards. VC needs to know what is going on. 
4 
The importance of people can not be underestimated. 
5 
In order for me to be interested in a proposal! need to see that the company has demonstrated 
that there is a clear development pathway. I need to see the plan and clinical strategy, even if this 
is only a pre-clinical staged company. I would like to see the draft label of the lead product and 
how it is going to be marketed and to whom. I like platform technology or a product pipeline---
no one-trick ponies. 
West Coast United States: Seattle and California Responses (4) 
1 
We are not a traditional venture firm. For one, our goal is to combine investor returns with 
positive social impact. To this end, we are only interested in opportunities which possess both of 
these traits. Specifically, we seek discovery-oriented, preclinical therapeutics companies founded 
by senior scientists with excellent research credentials. We are not interested in devices, services, 
or diagnostics. Typically, the entity will already have been incorporated and will have licensed 
the founding scientist's technology (or have an option to license contingent on funding) . The 
company may have raised some angel money, but usually no substantial institutional money. We 
are looking to invest up to a few million dollars to start, with the ability to invest substantially 
more over time 
2 
The maximum amount of investment into any company is capped at $50-100 million USD. 
3 
It would be fantastic to have a study done on VCs with respect to board dynamics and HR issues 
focusing in on management teams and how experience, trust and competence creates success. 
4 
Virtual start-up companies are the best with maybe 5 employees-big pharma are interested in 
companies with robust phase II data and entering strongly into a phase Ill trial. In a sense the 
small companies are not being folded; they are becoming entities like outsourced research 
companies where the new technology is being fostered and handed off to the big pharma. 
Sometimes a small biotech will be lucky to enter a niche market and then boom from there; such 
as Genentech did as well as Amgen did. Mostly though first player status pays the biggest. 
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CHAPTER SIX- Discussions and Conclusion 
6.1 Discussion and Implications of the Study: Decision Makine Process for 
Investment Selection 
First research question: 
1) Are there specific life science investment strategies and criteria that Venture 
Capitalists seek? 
From the study results and relating back to the literature discussion of the basic venture 
capital model and the roles that Venture Capitalists perform, it was found that there indeed 
are very specific life science investment strategies and criteria that Venture Capitalists use 
and seek. Fried and Hisrich's (1994) model of Venture Capital investment decision making 
process with inputs for Baeyens et al. , (2005) seems to be very much so, the model of choice, 
with specific focus on life science technologies targeted, preferred stages of development 
chosen, geographical location and minimum, maximum investment required to exit. 
Interestingly, the United States respondents, as opposed to the Canadian respondents, of the 
study were more strongly inclined to agree that these strategies and criteria are used and 
focused upon, especially with respect to investment amount required. Canadian respondents 
had a much broader spectrum of replies. 
Geographical location, the nearness of the actual development ofthe investment opportunity, 
was found to be important. As one United States respondent mentioned, he was not 
concerned where a technology or investment opportunity came from, but rather that the 
technology or investment could be established and developed near him, making it logistically 
easier for him to monitor. This brings into account the importance of monitoring by the 
Venture Capitalists. All of those interviewed were active monitors of their investment 
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portfolios, whether indirectly or directly as board members. As discussed earlier in the 
literature section, Venture Capital monitoring has been directly linked with the successful 
development of the investment, in particularly within the life science industry where the 
development timelines are both intricate and lengthy. Therefore selection of investment 
opportunities that logistically favour the ease of monitor is not surprising. 
There were four specific screening criteria discussed, including financial criteria, market size, 
intellectual property (technology) and management. Whereas all these screening criteria 
were agreed to as to their importance, management team characteristics were the 
overwhelming response choice by both Canadian and United States respondents as being the 
number one aspect that was sought after. Management experience and the ability to work 
with selected management were also found as being the number one challenge with respect to 
having successful opportunity development. This implies, and agrees with the peer reviewed 
literature, that management characteristics are almost more important than the actual 
technology itself. As one United States respondent commented: 
"It is easier to get to an opportunity exit with an experienced management team than 
with a management team that has little to no experience. I'd prefer to work with a poor 
technology that is being developed by an experienced management team any day over an 
incredible stellar technology that has an inexperienced management team. I have seen many 
stellar technologies fail because of inexperienced management teams. " 
The same respondent further elaborated that even though the major concern was with 
management, he felt that "this was truly a non issue as I can always place my own 
management team into the driving seat when necessary ". 
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Technology was the strong second strategy choice of the United States respondents, but 
surprisingly not the overall focus of the Canadian respondents who responded that stage of 
the technology was more important. One of the United States respondents mentioned that his 
most pressing difficulty was finding interesting and novel technologies that could be 
nurtured. 
There was a strong sense of passion detected by most of the respondents with respect to 
investing into life science technologies, especially ones that promised solutions to unmet 
medical needs. This implies that even though management teams are considered the most 
important trait of success of any investment, Venture Capitalists are also passionately 
focused on the technology that is being invested in and almost appear to have internalized 
their role as one of searcher for technological solutions, particular within the unmet medical 
needs arena. Of course, innovative technologies within an area that needs technological 
answers also carry a wealth ofbusiness possibilities. 
Another aspect of technology selection criteria was the focus on technology as intellectual 
property. Intellectual property is what the Venture Capital firm invests in and it is 
understandable that such intangible assets should be considered important. Therefore it is not 
surprising that all the respondents of the study felt that assessing the technology opportunity 
at hand, in terms of its value as an intellectual property, was extremely important. 
An interesting aspect with respect to selection was noted with the screening question of 
rejecting opportunities that represented unclear regulatory risks. The United States 
respondents fully agreed that these types of opportunities should not be pursued because they 
increased risk. Canadian respondents, however, did not concur. There was disagreement 
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from the Canadian respondents who felt that such risks were always either present or could 
be mitigated. The complete reverse, however, was found with respect to rejecting 
opportunities that carried negative public opinion. The majority of United States respondents 
disagreed that these technologies should be rejected and the majority of Canadian 
respondents agreed that they should. These two questions may have honed in on the 
investment environment that these two groups operate within as well as the stakeholders 
involved. Canadian respondents probably had much higher stakeholder risk with negative 
public opinion because of their government mandates, whereas United States may have felt 
that regulatory environments and key opinion leaders carried much higher cause for concern 
when considering whether a technology was worth pursuing. 
When taking into account the time frame in which the respondents sought to gain results and 
capital from their investments, United States respondents sought results on a shorter timeline 
span than Canadian respondents and were less flexible to expanding agreed upon timelines. 
This can be reflective, again, of the investment environment of the various respondents 
interviewed as well as perhaps the cultural differences of the two countries. A number ofthe 
Canadian respondents represented funds that were supported by the government of Canada. 
In these types of funds there was much less emphasis on when return on capital investment 
should be expected and as one of the respondents commented: "these are patient investment 
funds ". Patience was not an aspect reflected by the United States respondents and most of the 
respondents interviewed from United States did not access capital from government sources. 
Patience and tolerance, however, are two important characteristics required in life science 
technology development and investment. Years are required before an investment may see a 
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return. It was found that the results from the interviews correspond with the literature that 
periods ranging from three (3) to seven (7) years were the ideal time ranges sought by 
investors. However this does not reflect the true time lines of life science technology 
development already mentioned, in particular within the therapeutics arena where fifteen (15) 
years is not an unusual development time span. How do the Venture Capitalists move the 
technologies that they invest in, into the next stages of development? It was assumed that as 
soon as the life science technology is developed to a certain phase, exit strategies were 
pursued that would allow that technology to go to the next level of development. From the 
interviews it was found that M&A had been, in the recent past, the exit route of choice. This 
was concurred with by both the Canadian and the United States respondents. IPOs had been 
considered an exit route in the late 1990s but were no longer considered as such by most of 
the United States respondents. The United States respondents were particularly against the 
IPO method as an exit route, exclaiming that such routes were " .. . a pain in the butt ... " and 
" . .. only a way of driving a person insane ... " 
Interestingly, though it was not a route of choice by Canadian respondents, four Canadian 
respondents mentioned that they were considering IPOs as an important option for raising 
capital. This sentiment was also expressed by one of the United States respondents who 
stated that IPOs should be considered as another venue for raising important investment 
capital, but not as an exit route. This may appear as semantics on the part of the Venture 
Capitalists, but it is important to note that while IPOs may present difficulty for the Venture 
Capitalists with respect to exiting an investment quickly and smoothly, IPOs do provide the 
opportunity for Venture Capitalists to continue their investment in a technology that is 
believed in, an investment that may require a longer timeline to bear profit. 
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6.2 Discussion and Implications of the Study: Return on Investment and Financial 
Valuation 
The second research question: 
2) Do Venture Capitalists use specific valuation methods to identify investment 
opportunities that they fund? If yes, what processes and methods do they use to select 
investment opportunities? 
In order to survive as a Venture Capital firm, the investments that are made must make viable 
returns on investment that allow for both future capitals to be raised as well as for the 
survival of the Venture Capital firm. From the interviews with the Venture Capital 
respondents, there did not appear to be a clear opinion on what the returns should be. The 
ranges were anywhere for 10% to 1000% returns, but by taking the average of the answers, a 
range of 30-70% was achieved, which concurs with the literature expectations. It is possible 
that these broad ranges simply imply that with the high investment risk involved with respect 
to life sciences portfolios, the actual average returns may vary drastically from company to 
company depending on individual company success rates, current portfolios held and past 
investments of new and innovative technologies. As one of the respondents commented: 
"the investment is worth as much as the market is willing to pay for it at the time; no more 
and no less. " 
From the literature, it was discussed that many financial valuation techniques and models can 
become unpredictable when used with novel and early stage technology investment 
opportunities. This is especially the case with investment opportunities that have long 
timelines, unforeseen risks associated with them and no revenue flows for many years (Berlin 
1998; Elango eta/. , 1995; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sahlman 1990). The results from the 
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semi-formal interviews give trends and comments that support this literature opinion. The 
United States were extremely adamant that Discounted Cash Flows (DCFs) were less than 
useless for assessing life science investment opportunities, including medical device 
investments. One of the respondents mentioned that DCFs were " ... like making astrology 
predictions. " It was surprising that 40% of Canadian respondents neither agreed not disagree 
that DCFs were useful, giving no opinion at all. 
With respect to other valuation methods, simulation models appeared to be equally despised 
by the United States respondents as with the DCFs, but Canadian respondents gave broader 
base responses with 30% either strongly agreeing or agreeing that this type of technique was 
useful for predictions of investment worth. This may reflect that Canadian respondents have 
been using these models, finding some aspects of them useful. PIE multiples, were met with 
a broad response by all respondents, suggesting that this technique was most probably used 
as a comparator of what capital markets thought investment shares were worth rather than a 
direct measurement of what a specific technology was worth. 
Qualitative financial techniques, however, were the techniques of choice used for evaluation. 
Again this is in line with the literature discussed previously. Comparators and comparables 
were unanimously mentioned by all respondents in the study where techniques such as Rules 
of Thumb and qualitative market assessments were stated as extremely useful. When asked 
whether current financial techniques were useful and beneficial, at least 50% of all the 
respondents agreed that they were. Generally the comments reflected the sentiment that even 
though these techniques were far from perfect, they were the only ones available and they 
provided a "sanity check " for what the investment opportunities may be worth. Qualitative 
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techniques most probably allow the investors to achieve a sense of what a similar investment 
is worth compared to similar technologies from the recent past. This type of comparison 
would give a sense of confidence to the Venture Capitalists that they are, hopefully, not 
paying too much. Comparable assessments can, in a sense, be almost perceived as similar to 
real estate: completely dependent on what the market can bear and what a certain type of 
asset is worth at the time. The only difference being that the assets involved are mostly 
highly intangible life science technologies. In fact that is exactly what one of the respondents 
clearly stated with respect to the valuation methods used: "These [valuation methods] are 
the ones that we have and I have been using them for the past ten years. Truly it is about 
what people are willing to pay; supply and demand". 
With such types of valuation techniques used, it is not surprising, either, that Venture 
Capitalists request such high returns on investment. Comparably, the assessments are at best 
extremely subjective, requiring much cross referencing with past performance as well as 
competitor deals that may or may not depict similar circumstances. This in tum increases the 
risks. Comparables, where they are flexible and most probably the best to be used within 
these conditions, they do not begin to address the risks of information asymmetries that are 
associated with novel technologies. 
6.3 Discussion and Implications of the Study: Risk, Perception Risk and Information 
Asymmetry 
The third research question: 
3) Are Venture Capitalists susceptible to perception risks such as information 
asymmetries, when choosing life science investment opportunities? 
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The potential risks of information asymmetries are, as discussed in the literature review, huge 
with respect to any novel investment opportunity within the life sciences. It is a matter first 
of all of being able to understand the technologies and a matter of whether information 
relayed by the founder/management of the technology can be trusted. 
Trust and knowing someone from past experience, therefore, is a bit like hedging the bets 
against information asymmetry, protecting oneself against too much risk. It is to the point 
where management team qualifications can almost be considered as a valuation technique 
used for assessing the worth of the actual technology. With both the support of the literature 
as well as from the semi-formal interviews held, it appears that Venture Capitalists indeed 
operate using perception risks in a manner to mitigate the risks of possible information 
asymmetry, in this case the perception risk being the choice of management teams. Among 
respondents, the experience level of the management team was considered the number one 
criteria for investment selection. If the management team or founder was unknown or 
inexperienced, respondents commented that they were more likely not to pursue the 
opportunity. As one of the respondents commented: 
"Understanding the technology and the risks that are involved with the technology-
this can be very difficult. There are also a lot of challenges with IP and a lot of grey areas. 
The development pathways of the technology and clinical programs can only truly be 
conducted using trusted management teams who are proficient and have experience. 
In fact, from the intense focus that the respondents gave to the selection of trusted 
management teams it would seem that Venture Capitalists may perceive the possibility of 
information asymmetry risk as the highest possible risk with respect to life science 
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investments. As discussed in the literature section, this type of adverse selection may in tum 
increase unforeseen risks, or perhaps worse, select out novel life science technologies that 
may have huge impacts on unmet medical needs and lucrative investment benefits. Focus on 
management team selection can possibly impede the path to the development of new and 
novel technologies simply because an experienced management team may not be familiar 
with or have an adverse opinion against a certain technology. There are many examples 
where failed technology prototypes have created preconceived opinions for the future of 
those same technologies such as in the case of antisense technologies, protoxins, and medical 
devices such the initial cardiac stents and retractable needles. In these cases, regulatory 
guidelines were usually confusing and unclear, increasing the risk of possible development 
failure (Evans and Nikhil, 2003; DiMasi, 2003; Bains, 2004; Angell, 2004). Respondents 
were asked whether they felt it was important to reject investment opportunities that had 
unclear regulatory guidelines and risks using examples such as the ones just stated. 
Interestingly a majority of respondents from the United States agreed outright, but the 
majority of Canadian respondents either did not choose to agree or disagree or simply 
disagreed. 
Even though the mitigation of information asymmetries is important, there needs to be 
recognition of the types of risk this mitigation may entail. Experienced management teams 
may develop foregone conclusions in thinking that they know what types of technologies are 
worth pursuing and which are not. There are many historical examples where life science 
technologies that eventually had some of the largest impact on the medical world, as well as 
being financially rewarding, were initially shelved and ignored by experienced management. 
This can be reflected in life science drug technologies such as Herceptin, Prozac and Viagra, 
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present day blockbuster drugs, which were all placed on the laboratory shelf and almost 
forgotten in part because of management decisions (Angell, 2004; Bains, 2004; DiMasi, 
2003; Evans and Nikhil, 2003) 
Aspects of this study, however, point directly to the vigilance of Venture Capitalists. When 
asked the important of excluding investment opportunities that are difficult to scientifically 
understand, 50% of all the respondents disagreed. One respondent from the United States 
stated: 
"One can always get assistance from key opinion leaders and other scientists. Novel 
technologies are not always easy to understand. " 
This gives some evidence that some of the respondents in this study were not willing to reject 
technologies on the pure fact that they were not immediately understood. But it does 
highlight again the reliance of opinions from trusted managers. There was much emphasis 
placed on investment selection with respect to technologies by both study groups and 
especially from the respondents in the United States. How technology selection directly links 
to management team selection, as well as how the deciphering of difficult to understand 
technologies is achieved, was not directly studied. Comments, however, did give some 
insight where one respondent from Canada noted that: 
" ... sitting down with the founding scientist is important to build a relationship, but 
also to get a handle on the technology. But it takes time to develop a trusting relationship 
and that is not always easy. " 
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6.4 Discussion and Implications of the Study: Education & Experience Leading to 
Adverse selection & Overconfidence 
The forth and final research question: 
4) Are Venture Capitalists qualified to make investment decisions on new life science 
investment opportunities? 
Specifically: 
4a) What are the educational and direct industry experience levels of Venture 
Capitalists? 
4b) Does amount of education and/or experience have an effect on which life science 
investment opportunities are chosen? 
4c) Does a life science investment choice influence future life science investment 
choice? 
From an educational point of view, both the Canadian and United States respondents have 
high levels of education with the lowest level being an undergraduate university/college level 
degree and the highest being the level of PhD or MBA. Canadian and United States 
respondents have similar amounts of years of experience with respect to working in Venture 
Capital. The Canadian respondents, however, appear to have remained in the same initial 
Venture Capital firm they began whereas the United States respondents had worked for 
several firms over the course of their careers. An interesting aspect was that Canadian 
respondents also had less, average direct work experience with the life science sector before 
they worked as Venture Capitalists compared to the United States respondents. In this aspect 
it may be conceivable to state that Canadian respondents may be at a disadvantage with 
respect to having insights into the workings of the life science sector. 
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In order to assess whether Venture Capitalists are qualified with respect to investing in life 
science opportunities, it is important to understand whether amount of education and/or 
experience have an effect on which life science investment opportunities are chosen. This 
links to the possibilities of overestimating one ' s own knowledge and ability in making the 
correct decision (Griffin and Vary, 1996). Zacharakis and Shepherd, (2001) suggest that if a 
person relies fully on his/her "knowledge", then overconfidence in the legitimacy of the final 
decision is linked with the amount of education or "knowledge" that person has. When the 
direct question of whether respondents tended to select opportunities related to their 
educational background over those that did not, the majority of respondents concurred that 
this was indeed so. This would assume that many of the respondents depended directly on 
their educational background to assist them with understanding and choosing investments. It 
also suggests that there is possibility for overconfidence to be established with respect to the 
decisions that are made, as discussed in the literature review. This type of overconfidence 
can be problematic because it impedes the Venture Capitalist ' s ability to perceive investment 
opportunities for what they truly are (Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). 
It has been shown, however, that while Venture Capitalists may be susceptible to 
overconfidence in investment choices, they also vary about the decisions that they make 
(Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). Cognitive research literature has shown that the more 
information that is gathered, the more confidence is given to the final decision made 
(Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). However, from the study conducted by Zacharakis and 
Shepherd (200 1) they found that the link of overconfidence with respect to huge amounts of 
information was weak with respect to the Venture Capitalists that they studied. This 
somewhat concurs with this study, where it was found that even though a majority of the 
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respondents agreed that they relied on their past education, comments also suggest that 
individuals dealt with challenges posed by having too much information, one being company 
meetings where technology opportunities were discussed as well as gaining opinions from 
key opinion leaders to sort through large amounts and varied information. It therefore would 
appear that the amount of individual education and information was not always enough to 
establish confidence. The confidence that was gained from the opinions of experienced and 
trusted industry leaders, scientists and management is alluded to as being a much stronger 
motivator for selecting or rejecting an opportunity. The extent, to which these other 
individuals were used to assist with technology assessment, was not measured directly in this 
study. As to the perception risks that may occur with too little educational background and 
experience, as discussed by Shepherd et al, (2003) and Franke et al. , (2006), it may be that 
the respondents who disagreed that they selected opportunities based on their educational 
background, made efforts to gain advice from trusted and experienced scientists, 
management and key opinion leaders - trusted individuals who were related to a particular 
technology being assessed. This, again, is difficult to measure from this study. 
In this study past investment choices were found to be associated with future investment 
choices. This relationship can be perceived as a way that the respondents (90%) used 
experience and selection as a method to spread risk within their investment portfolios (Amit 
et al. , 1998; Patzelt et al. , 2006). Patzelt et al. , (2006) argued from their results that this 
would assume that their respondents and Venture Capitalists as a whole would be considered 
passive investment selectors, selecting purely on a diversification strategy. Venture 
Capitalists are indeed far from passive, having substantial influences over which opportunity 
is chosen and the direct management responsibilities that they take with their portfolios. As 
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agreed by Patzelt et al. , (2006) past investment choices most likely influence future 
investment choices due to the possible synergies that may be achieved either through 
working with familiar founders , management and or the technology itself. This suggests that 
overconfidence may play a large role in investment selection and reflects back on the 
question of information asymmetries, management selection and perception risks. 
Cognitive theory states that positive experience can play an overemphasized role in decision 
making (Baron 2004; Griffin and Vary, 1996). Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) discuss the 
act of optimistic overconfidence which is the tendency to overestimate the possibility that an 
outcome will occur based on the positive experiences of the past. The authors further discuss 
that when making decisions based on positive experiences in the past there is a likelihood of 
investment committing resources without thoroughly considering additional information. In 
this study, the United States respondents firmly agreed (70%) that past successful experience 
did influence their future choices, whereas only 40% of the Canadian respondents agreed. 
Interestingly 40% of the Canadian and 20% ofUnited States respondents neither agree nor 
disagree. When asked why they chose to neither agree nor disagree, three of the Canadian 
respondents stated that they were concerned with possibilities of adverse selection and 
overconfidence that didn' t add value, but instead initiated" .. . taking the eye of the balf'. 
This implies that adverse selection and overconfidence does exist, in particular with respect 
to making future choices using experience from the past, and that at least some of the 
Venture Capitalists were aware ofthese risks. 
Risk and adverse selection was linked with the comprehension of new and novel technologies 
was explored. As stated in the literature review, life science technologies are rated as some 
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of the most intricate and difficult to understand out of all other types of technologies 
(Baeyens et al., 2006; Evans and Nikhil, 2003; Lockett et al., 2002). If the life science 
technologies are difficult to understand there may be increased overconfidence in choosing 
technologies that are either familiar from past experience or ones that are comparatively 
easier to understand than others. With respect to whether Venture Capitalists feel that life 
science investment opportunities are more difficult to understand than other types of 
technologies, it was found that a majority of the United States respondents agreed. This 
would suggest that there is definitely an awareness of the difficulties in understanding the 
intricacies involved with life science technologies. A cautious approach was perceived by 
the response from the Canadian respondents who, with a majority, neither agreed nor 
disagreed. This caution may be reflective as to what other types of technologies could be 
compared with life science technologies. As one of the Canadian respondents mentioned: 
"Life science technologies are difficult to assess, but whether they are more or less 
difficult to assess than other technologies, I simply don't know because I don't work in those 
other fields. " 
But as one of the United States respondents stated: 
"Having worked in a broad range of technologies in the past, I can definitely state 
that life science technologies are much more intricate to understand. Human being's 
biological systems are extremely complex. Trying to understand technologies that aim to 
repair medical conditions within such complexity can create multitudes of unimaginable 
reactions, contemplations which give me many sleepless nights. " 
Reflecting back on criteria and selection methods used by Venture Capitalists, it was 
suggested in the literature review that ifVenture Capitalists used specific models and 
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processes, then investment opportunity selection would possibly becomes more rationalized 
than intuitive (Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). This in tum would decrease the possibilities of 
perception risks and adverse selection. From the respondents' comments in this study, 
valuation techniques and models that are presently available were felt to be ineffective when 
used as a way to compare such novel and early stage technologies. If new models can be 
created that allow for the use of comparables and flexible risk levels, then perhaps investment 
assessment may become more rational. Another area that needs scrutiny, as suggested by 
Shepherd and Zacharakis (2002), is the use of tools that assess past successes and failures in 
an analytical format. These tools, however, tend to focus on specific situations that may not 
be very pertinent to new situations and thus become another form of comparables. As to 
models that attempt to predict the future, many of these are dependent on future cash flow 
predictions, predictions that simply cannot realistically be made until much later stages of a 
life science technology development. 
6.5 Discussion and Implications of the Study: International Difference in Venture 
Capital & Opportunity Selection Criteria - An Observational Inference 
This study was a comparative study that interviewed Venture Capitalists from the Canadian 
West Coast and the United States West Coast. Whereas specific portfolio differences and 
stage of technology were not researched, selection behaviours were. From the study there 
were some interesting differences that imply that investment behaviour and risks are 
perceived quite differently between the two countries with respect to life science investment. 
United States respondents were less apt to agree that public opinion mattered in investment 
decisions than the Canadian respondents were. Where this most likely reflects the 
investment climate and portfolios that are held by the Venture Capitalists, it may also be a 
reflection on different value systems of the two countries. Furthermore, risks such as 
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regulatory risks were perceived more strongly by the United States respondents than the 
Canadian respondents, reflecting that perhaps governmental risks and legal liability are more 
strongly linked to choice in the United States than in Canada. This observation would also 
support the Manigart et al, (2000) discussion on how culture, legal and governmental systems 
affect the behaviours of investors within a particular country. 
United States respondents were found to invest outside their geographic region at a 
significantly higher rate than Canadian respondents. This international difference may be 
reflective of the funds that were held by the Venture Capitalists. Investment funds may have 
had particular mandates of investing money into specific areas. This was certainly the case 
with Canadian respondents, where a number of the companies interviewed had government 
mandates to invest in technologies from British Columbia. This could be conceived as 
extremely limiting for Venture Capital industry in Canada if this is a common trend. Where 
this type of investment behaviour does support local life science industries, it also prevents 
capital markets and competition from occurring. The fact that almost 80% of United States 
respondents stated they invested in Asia and Europe compared to 5% of Canadians, suggests 
that perhaps there may be important investment opportunities being missed by the Canadian 
Venture Capital industry, especially with respect to life science. 
Another trend that was noticed was that United States respondents were more focused on 
financial criteria of investment opportunities than Canadian respondents, whether that 
consisted of minimum or maximum investment required to exit or the time duration to gain a 
return on investment. This implies that United States respondents may be more concerned 
with getting a return on investment, and Canadian respondents are perhaps more patient. 
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With respect to life science technologies that take a long time to develop, perhaps Canadian 
respondents can be perceived as being more conducive in nurturing their investments. But 
perhaps United States respondents can be perceived as being investors that want to make a 
living. 
When in conversation with the respondents during the interviews, passion for their life 
science portfolios was noted equally from both countries. Comments regarding their board 
responsibilities, times spent making presentations as well as giving advice to their portfolio 
companies gave an insight into the large monitoring roles that Venture Capitalists provide. I 
was intrigued, however, by the difference in past life science experience levels between the 
Canadian and United States respondents. This could be reflective on the mere fact that the 
United States is where life science technologies first began their development through the 
support of the Venture Capital industry and simply, United States respondents have had more 
time to gather previous life science experience, especially via biotechnologies and medical 
devices. However, this was not directly researched and needs to be further studied. 
The two last questions posed in the questionnaire focused on the broad topics of success rate 
of life science technologies and one specifically on biotechnologies and their cost of 
development. These questions were asked mainly to gather general opinion about the life 
science research and development, but also to obtain a sense of whether there were attitude 
differences between Canadian and United States respondents. The only difference between 
the two countries with respect to these questions lay in the fact that a large minority of the 
Canadian respondents disagreed to both questions . 
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Why Canadian respondents should disagree can only be assumed from the comments that 
two of the respondents gave; that being that they had not personally seen the enormous lack 
of success rate and huge amounts of infrastructure costs that may have been experienced in 
the United States. At this time, even though Vancouver is a vibrant community in life 
science technology development, it is also a small and young community compared to areas 
in the West Coast of United States where large life science companies specializing in 
biotechnology and general drug development, medical devices as well as contract research 
organizations exist (Audretsch, 2001). This youth of the West Coast Canadian life science 
community may be, in essence, what largely distinguishes the two Venture Capital 
respondent groups the most. 
6.6 Conclusion 
If Venture Capitalists can only invest in a specific number of portfolio investments, it is 
crucial that the investment opportunities chosen are those that are most likely to succeed. 
The potential of Venture Capital rejection of early stage, novel life science investment 
opportunities due to perception risks, whether due to information asymmetry, adverse 
selection or overconfidence, may pose a large problem for new life science ventures that are 
trying to raise capital. It may not only limit Venture Capitalists from picking highly 
successful projects that can create wealth for its shareholders, but perhaps more importantly, 
limit what technology, in particular life science technology, that can be pursued and 
developed. 
With the support from the literature review as well as from the direct results of the semi-
formal interviews, there is supportive evidence that Venture Capitalists who operate in the 
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life sciences sector use specific selection criteria, such as management teams and geographic 
region, and that these investors rely on valuation techniques, particularly market assessments 
and comparables. 
As a whole, the Venture Capitalists who were interviewed can be conceived as qualified in 
making life science investment decisions. This is particularly the case where education and 
experience is considered. Of course, this opinion is dependant entirely on the individual 
Venture Capitalist. Where education is one measurement of qualification, it is not always a 
direct measure of the actual type of work that a person ends up doing. Whether one type of 
education is better than another, was not measured and beyond the scope of this study. With 
respect to experience, it again would depend on the level and type of experience that is/was 
practiced and whether it is pertinent to the future act of doing something else. 
It would appear from this study that Venture Capitalists are or can be susceptible to adverse 
selection and overconfidence during investment opportunity selection. It also appears that 
adverse selection may occur as a way of reducing other types of risk such as the potential for 
information asymmetry. Whether adverse selection and overconfidence, as well as to what 
degree of each, make a Venture Capitalist unqualified as a life science investment selector, 
requires research linking directly to investment success with past opinion and investment 
choice; research that needs to be performed in future studies. 
As a final note, there does appear to be interesting differences between the two comparator 
groups. Canadian Venture Capital investors interviewed tended to present themselves as 
cautious investors, concerned with ethics and moral issues as well as selectors of criteria and 
techniques. The United States investors, on the other hand, were more concerned with 
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choosing investments for the sponsorship of important innovation to create wealth, searching 
internationally if required. Disregarding the various motives and differences, however, I 
found that all respondents were equally passionate about what they did and how they had 
sponsored innovation and productivity through business development. 
6.7 Limitations of this Study 
There were several limitations in this research study, where the first and intentional one was 
the scope of this study: that being West Coast Canada and United States. The results that 
were found and discussed may only be conducive to the region of study and thereby signify 
geographical and regional effects only. 
The next most important limitation was sample size of respondents. Special effort was made 
to directly interview the respondents mainly because previous literature research noted that 
this would be the method choice when interviewing senior level Venture Capitalists. This 
method also greatly reduced the amount of individuals that could be interviewed in a specific 
period of time. 
Venture Capital interviews were spread over a greater period of time than first anticipated. 
This was due to the very busy schedules of the Venture Capitalists interviewed. Financial 
markets and conditions may have changed during this period and some and may have led to 
skewed results with respect to which financial valuation methods and exit opportunities 
Venture Capitalists preferred. 
Most ofthe Venture Capitalists interviewed were currently employed as Venture Capitalists. 
Only two of the respondents had previously been Venture Capitalists, but were not presently 
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working as such. This biased the sample size towards successful Venture Capitalists and 
may have influenced the answers that they gave, particularly to the questions that were used 
in the discussion of perception risks and overconfidence. 
6.8 Recommendations for Future Research 
From the observations and results of this study as well as the comments received from 
respondents, further research into both the dynamics and the potential problems with 
management teams is required. Since management teams are specifically selected for and are 
such an integral part of the development of life science technologies, it is important to 
understand what management contribute and how they interact with the Venture Capital 
investors that they, in a sense, work for. This would allow a more complete comprehension 
of the value added with respect to selection based on management team. Some research has 
been started in this area, including Higashide and Birley (2002). 
Furthermore study into the understanding of avoidance of information asymmetry through 
the selection of management teams as well as consequences of these relationships, need to be 
additionally explored. Some interesting recent work has already been started within this area 
including Parhankangas and Landstrom (2006). 
Further study into the direct linkages of education and experience levels with investment 
success rate should also be pursued. As well, the understanding of overconfidence, how it is 
measured, whether it truly is a risk, and whether overconfidence is an asset or liability for 
Venture Capitalists, needs to be measured directly against Venture Capitalists' life science 
portfolios. Overconfidence may lead to adverse selection, but it may also be a process that 
allows for initiation to take place to create future wealth and productivity. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Questionnaire 
Life Science Investment Proposal Evaluation 
Section A - Background 
Interviewee Name & Title: 
Date of interview: 
Company/Organization Name: 
City: Phone: Email: 
Gender: 
Male D Female D 
l. Please describe your responsibilities in this company/organization w.r.t. life science 
opportunity evaluation. 
2. How long have you worked with your current company/organization? 
3. How many years have you evaluated opportunities as a VC? 
4. What is the level of education that you have completed (please check all applicable) 
A. HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE DIPLOMA D 
b. Technical/Professional School graduate diploma D 
c. University/College undergraduate degree D 
d. University level graduate degree: Masters D 
e. University level graduate degrees: PhD D 
f. Masters of Business Administration (MBA) D 
5. Have you worked in a life science company? 
YES:O NO:D 
If yes, how many years and in what capacity: 
6. Does your company invest/operate in areas outside of your geographic region? 
YES:0 
If 'Yes'; please enter location(s): 
City(s) 
Province( s) 
State(s) 
NO:D 
Country(s) 
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-Section B - Life science Prol!osal Evaluation 
Proposal Assessment 
7. Whens creening life science investment opportunities, your strategy/company strategy 
a. Is to focus on specific types of life science industries (drug/devices etc.) 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
b. Is to focus on specific types of life science technologies (small molecules, antisense, 
stem cell therapeutics) 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
c. Is to focus on specific disease indications (cancer, diabetes etc.) 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
d. Is to focus on a preferred stage of technology development (research, early stage 
versus late stage development) 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
e. Is to focus on the geographical location of the proposal/company. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
f. Is to focus on the minimum and/or maximum investment required to exit. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
8. What is /was the main investment strategy (ies) of your company/organization when screening 
life scie nee proposals? 
9. During Initial Screening Phase of a life science investment proposal: 
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a. Financial criteria are important (Estimated potential proposal worth through financial 
assessments?) 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
b. Potential market size criteria are important. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
c. Intellectual Property (IP) is important. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
d. Management Team and skill are important. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
10. It is important to exclude investment proposals that have unclear regulatory guidelines and 
risks (e.g. some biotechnologies: liposomes, antisense or protoxins). 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
11. It is important to exclude investment proposals that carry negative public opinion (e.g. foetus 
stem cell research; genetically modified organisms, nanotechnologies). 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
12. It is important to exclude investment proposals that are scientifically difficult to 
understand. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
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-Valuatio n Methods 
13. Disco unted Cash Flow (NPVs,) is a good valuation method for life science proposals. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
14. Simul ation models such as Monte Carlo (Crystal Ball) are good valuation methods for life 
sc1en ce investment proposals. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
15. Multi ples such as Price/Earning Multiples are good valuation methods for life science 
invest ment proposals. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
16. Tee hnology market value assessments such as for disease indications are good qualitative 
valuat ion methods for life science investment proposals. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
17. What other valuation techniques are used? Other 
A. REAL OPTIONS D 
b. Enterprise Value D 
c. Book Value D 
d. Payback Period D 
e. Other D 
18. Whic h valuation methods have you found most useful? 
19. Curre nt valuation methods are adequate in evaluating life science investment proposals. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
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20. Past investment choices influence future investment choices. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
21. You tend to select investment proposals that are related to your educational/work background 
over those that are not. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
22. You tend to select investment proposals that are similar to past successes over those that are 
not. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
23. Life science investment proposals are more difficult to assess than other proposals. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
24. VC experience/expertise is positively linked to successful investment proposal selection. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
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Section C - Final Comments 
25. What hurdle rate of return do you expect from successful investment? 
26. What proportion of your investments do you expect (in the long term) will reach a successful 
exit? 
27. What is the most desirable exit route? 
A. EARN-OUT D 
b. IPO D 
c. M&A D 
d. Depends on Market Conditions D 
e. Other (Please name) D 
28. How long does a VC expect to wait for a successful investment to return capital? 
29. What are some of the key challenges for VCs in terms of selecting a life science investment 
proposal? Please describe. 
30. You would not invest in a difficult to understand life science investment proposal. 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
31. Do you agree that the success rate of life science (particularly biotechnologies) from lab-
bench to commercialization is 1 in 10 000 (including failures) . 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
32. Do you agree that the costs associated with life science development, in particular 
biopharmaceutical development, from Concept stage to Market is close to 800 million USD 
(includes failures, infrastructure etc.)? 
STRONGLY AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
D D D D D 
33. Is there anything else about life science investment proposals that you would like to 
add? 
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